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I. INTRODUCTION
N times of war, such as the present one between America and the Al-
Qaeda worldwide terrorist network, basic ordering agreements
(BOAs) may be one of the most important means by which
America's Armed Forces receive their military supplies and services. Ba-
sic ordering agreements are agreements between the Federal Govern-
ment and private contractors to provide needed military supplies and/or
services, at any future time, if and when the Federal Government needs
them. Under BOAs, a private-sector contractor must remain ready, will-
ing, and able to furnish supplies or services to our Armed Forces when-
ever needed. Accordingly, BOAs are essential to our nation's armed
services because they provide those needed military goods, supplies and
services at a moment's notice, enabling our nation to immediately re-
spond in an effective way to any attack on America. BOAs allow the
Federal Government, e.g., our Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps,
to purchase immediately the vital supplies and services it needs for emer-
gency wars or emergency conflicts.
This article is the story of BOAs: how they began; how they work; and
more particularly what their shortcomings are from the viewpoint of the
private contractor when it attempts to collect its payments from the Fed-
eral Government for its goods and services. This article explains the
"Catch-22 Chameleon" problem intrinsic in all BOAs; how my former
court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, ruled on this "Catch-22
Chameleon" problem in two conflicting ways; and how the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resolved this "Catch-22 Chame-
leon" problem. This article also proffers suggestions for needed changes
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to help resolve the "Catch-22 Cha-
meleon" problem that has affected all BOAs.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)' and the Department of
1. The FAR is the primary document in the Federal Acquisition Regulations System,
containing uniform policies and procedures that govern the acquisition activity of all fed-
eral agencies. 48 C.F.R § 1.101 (1999). The FAR is prepared, issued, and maintained
jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the NASA
Administrator. Id. at § 1.103. See generally, Federal Acquisition Regulation System, 48
2002]
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Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) 2 contain all the rules and regula-
tions which guide the dealings between the Federal Government and pri-
vate contractors. They both allow for the use of BOAs as a basis for
many types of government procurement contracts. 3 The FAR explains
that BOAs may be used to expedite contracting for "uncertain require-
ments for supplies or services when specific items, quantities, and prices
are not known at the time the agreement is executed, but a substantial
number of requirements ... are anticipated." '4 It explicates that BOAs
save the government money, thus allowing it to be prudent in spending
and ultimately saving the taxpayers' money. 5 Each BOA must contain,
C.F.R. §§ 1.000-9905.563 (1999), also available at http:www.arnet.gov/far (last modified
Apr. 4, 2002). See also RALPH C. NASH, JR., ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REF-
ERENCE BOOK 235 (1998).
2. The DFARS is the procurement regulation applicable to the Department of De-
fense (DOD) that implements and supplements the FAR:
It applies specifically to procurement involving the Office of the Secretary of
Defense; the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the De-
fense Logistics Agency (DLA) and other defense agencies. The FAR and
DFARS contain guidance and direction to DOD contracting personnel as to:
(1) which provisions, clauses, cost principles, and Cost Accounting Standards
are authorized for DOD contracts; and (2) what other procedures and ac-
tions must be followed in awarding and administering DOD contracts. The
DFARS is not a stand-alone document; it must be read in conjunction with
the FAR.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 177.
3. See FAR Types of Contracts, 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (1999). The Basic Ordering
Agreement is described as:
a written instrument of understanding, negotiated between an agency, con-
tracting activity, or contracting office and a contractor, that contains (1)
terms and clauses applying to future contracts (orders) between the parties
during its term, (2) a description, as specific as practical, of supplies and ser-
vices to be provided, and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering fu-
ture orders under the basic ordering agreement.
48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a). It adds that a basic ordering agreement "is not a contract," and
therefore, presumably cannot ever be a contract. Id. 48 C.F.R. § 216.703(c) adds time limi-
tations to military BOAs by stating: "[t]he period during which orders may be placed
against a basic ordering agreement may not exceed three years." It provides for limited
extensions, stating "[t]he contracting officer, with the approval of the chief of the con-
tracting office, may grant extensions for up to two years." Id. Accordingly, it appears that
a military BOA may receive one or more two-year extensions indefinitely.
4. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(b); see also THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK
which defines a BOA as:
A written instrument of understanding (not a contract) negotiated between a
procuring activity and a contractor. A BOA contains (1) terms and clauses
that will apply to any future orders placed during the BOAs term; (2) a
description, as specific as practicable, of supplies or services to be provided;
and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering future orders. BOAs
may be used to expedite contracting for supplies or services when specific
items, quantity, and prices are not known but a substantial number of re-
quirements are anticipated. They are frequently issued to multiple contrac-
tors and may not be used to avoid the requirements of competition.
NASH ET. AL., supra note 1, at 55-56 (internal citations omitted).
5. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(b) adds that "[u]nder proper circumstances, the use of these
procedures can result in economies [cost savings] in ordering parts for equipment support
by reducing administrative lead-time, inventory, investment, and inventory obsolescence
due to design changes."
[Vol. 55
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inter alia, six essential contractual elements of information. 6 Notwith-
standing these extensive information requirements, the Federal Govern-
ment has stubbornly held that BOAs by themselves are not contracts and
accordingly do not impart any contractual rights, such as the right to sim-
ple payment, to damages, or to lost profits for breach, for the contractors
who execute BOAs with the United States Government. 7 Because the
Government's non-contractual interpretation of BOAs permits it to can-
cel BOAs unilaterally and to simultaneously avoid payment of breach of
contract damages or lost profits, contractors repeatedly have called upon
the United States Court of Federal Claims, the Washington Boards of
Contract Appeals (the Washington Boards), and the Comptroller Gen-
eral for help in enforcing their rights under a BOA. The question of
when a BOA becomes an enforceable contract and when a private con-
tractor can be assured of receiving payment for its goods and services is
the "Catch-22 Chameleon" question. When the Federal Government
desires goods and services immediately, it calls the BOA a contract; how-
ever, when it wishes to cancel a BOA, it refuses to acknowledge that the
BOA is an enforceable contract.
Accordingly, the Government's position on BOAs contains an inherent
contradiction and an unreasonable inconsistency. Indeed, it is fundamen-
tally unfair for the Government to treat BOAs as contracts when it serves
its purposes, yet deprive private contractors that same right when con-
tractors seek redress before the Washington Boards or United States
Court of Federal Claims.8 Because of BOAs' fundamentally flawed inter-
6. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(c)(1) states that each BOA must: (1) "[d]escribe the method
for determining prices to be paid to the contractor for supplies or services"; (2) "[i]nclude
delivery terms and conditions or specify how they will be determined"; (3) "[list one or
more Government activities authorized to issue orders under the agreement"; (4)
"[s]pecify the point at which each order becomes a binding contract (e.g., issuance of the
order, acceptance of the order in a specified manner, or failure to reject the order within a
specified number of days"; (5) "[p]rovide that failure to reach agreement on price for any
order issued before its price is established . . .is a dispute under the Disputes Clause
included in the basic ordering agreement"; and (6) "[i]f fast payment procedures will apply
to orders, include the special data required by [48 C.F.R. §] 13.403."
7. The following cases are from agency boards that date back to 1993: In re Petersen
Equipment, 96-1 BCA (CCH) 28,070 (Ag. B.C.A. Dec. 18, 1995) (finding that two Forest
Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements (ERRAs), standing alone, were not
legally binding contracts but were similar to BOAs and therefore lacked the necessary
consideration to constitute a contract); Petersen Equipment, 95-2 BCA (CCH) I 27,676(Ag. B.C.A., May 3, 1995) (concluding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over a contrac-
tor's claim for wrongful termination because EERAs were BOAs and were thus not bind-
ing contracts); Appeal of Ann Riley & Assocs., Ltd., 93-3 BCA (CCH) 25,963
(D.O.T.C.A.B., Mar. 30, 1993) (deciding that the government could not terminate a con-
tract for default because the agreement did not create a binding contract).
8. As a federal judge for over seventeen years, I have always strongly believed that, if
at all possible under the circumstances and relevant law, justice, fairness, and equity must
result from any judge's decision. See, e.g., Harry & Keith Mertz Constr., Inc., 97-1 BCA
(CCH) 28,802 (Ag. B.C.A. Feb. 10, 1997) (where, as the presiding judge, I found a way to
pay the private contractor for additional work, notwithstanding the fact that the contractor
was defaulted; that the contractor did not provide the required 30-day written notice to the
contracting officer of the constructive change; and that the contractor did not request extra
time because of a constructive suspension). Accordingly, a presiding judge should never
allow one party to interpret a law or regulation in two inapposite ways, depending upon
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nal inconsistency, BOA litigation before the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims, the Washington Boards, and the Comptroller General has
been pervasive, ubiquitous, and extensive, going back at least sixty-four
years, or more than half a century of government procurement history.9
The irony of this problem, i.e., the contractor's "Catch-22 Chameleon"
problem, is that the Federal Government's postulation that BOAs are not
contracts also simultaneously undermines the Government's legal argu-
ment when it wishes to apply the important Truth In Negotiations Act
which interpretation suited its particular position that particular day, e.g., holding a BOA
in one instance a contract when trying to enforce the BOA, and holding a BOA not to be a
contract when trying to escape its contractual responsibilities.
9. Searching Westlaw using, inter alia, the terms "Basic Ordering Agreements,"
"Memorandum of Understandings," "Memorandum of Agreements," "Uniform Grain
Storage Agreements," "Master Agreement for Repair and Alteration of Vessels," and
"Extreme Emergency Rental Agreements," revealed a total of 743 disputes requiring deci-
sions from agency boards, federal courts, or the Comptroller General's Office, going back
over half a century. While the number may be slightly less because there may have been
some overlap in cases, nevertheless the search demonstrated the extensive disputes and
litigation engendered by Basic Ordering Agreements. A Westlaw search of the Comptrol-
ler General's Decisions under the search term "Memorandum of Understanding" revealed
180 decisions dating as far back as November 18, 1936, sixty-five years ago. See, e.g., Act-
ing Comptroller General Elliott to the Sec'y of Agric., 16 Comp. Gen. 499 (1936) (where a
university challenged paying benefits to a U.S. Army veterinarian working for it on a grant,
the Comptroller General stated that the agreement is both legal and proper since the funds
of the department were used for separate and distinct purposes apart from those of the
university). A Westlaw search of all federal courts using the search terms "Memorandum
of Agreement" & "Government Contract" revealed forty-seven decisions dating back fifty-
two years. See, e.g., Essex Const. Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 1212 (1949) (finding that the
subcontractor did not have an enforceable contract with the prime, therefore the govern-
ment did not have to pay the subcontractor). A similar search of all the agency boards
using the term "Memorandum of Understanding" revealed 128 decisions going back forty-
six years. See, e.g., Appeal of Georgia Power Co., IBCA 31 (1955) (holding that a MOA
between TVA and Georgia Power Company, where the company was billed for electrical
energy relative to the wasting of water at the direction of the Corps of Engineers, was not a
contract). A search among all agency boards for decisions concerning "Basic Ordering
Agreements" revealed 116 cases dating back thirty-three years. See, e.g., Appeal of
Fairchild Hiller Corp. Republic Aviation Div., 68-1 BCA (CCH) 7,025 (A.S.B.C.A. 1968)
(holding the BOA to be a contract because of detrimental reliance). A similar search of
the Comptroller General's decisions using the term "Basic Ordering Agreements" re-
vealed 114 decisions dating back thirty-four years. See, e.g., To Traid Corp., B-159,718,
1967 WL 2255 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 25, 1967) (holding that the BOA with Traid for gun cam-
era magazines was not an enforceable contract). A search of the all federal courts using
the term "Basic Ordering Agreements" revealed twenty-two decisions dating back twenty-
three years. See, e.g., Sperry Flight Sys. v. United States, 548 F.2d 915 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (grant-
ing the Government's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction because the
BOA was not a contract). A search of all the agency boards using the term "UGSA," for
Uniform Grain Storage Agreements, revealed nineteen decisions that date back twenty-
two years. See, e.g., Appeal of Van Stafford, 79-2 BCA (CCH) 13,979 (Ag. B.C.A. 1979)
(finding that under UGSA the CCC may issue an order for grain at any time). A search of
all federal courts using the combined terms of "Memorandum of Understanding" and
"Government Contract" revealed seventy-nine cases dating back nineteen years. See, e.g.,
Estate of Schott v. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) $ 1188 (1982). Finally, a search of all agency
boards using the term "EERA," for Extreme Emergency Rental Agreements, revealed
five decisions dating back six years. See, e.g., Petersen Equip., 95-2 BCA (CCH) 27,676
(Ag. B.C.A. 1995) (granting the government's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss after finding




(TINA)' ° to BOAs. Because TINA only applies to enforceable contracts,
the Government's contention that BOAs are not contracts would deny
TINA's application to BOAs. This article explores this entire "Catch-22
Chameleon" problem inherent in BOAs, from its genesis to its ultimate
resolution by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(the Federal Circuit), and proffers my denouement for further improve-
ments and refinements.
Through the middle 1990s, almost all of the Washington Boards of
Contract Appeals (BCAs)" and the United States Court of Federal
Claims (Federal Claims Court) continued to hold that BOAs, pursuant to
the FAR, were not contracts and accordingly could not form the basis of
providing the Federal Claims Court or the Washington Boards of Con-
tract Appeals with jurisdiction to hear contract assertions from govern-
ment contractors seeking, inter alia, Contracts Dispute Act (CDA) 12
monetary claims.13 Therefore, any contractor filing such a suit before the
10. Truth in Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (2002); 41 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2002).
11. The Boards of Contract Appeals are administrative boards established in the dif-
ferent procuring agencies to hear and decide disputes under the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA) of 1978. NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 64. There are presently 11 BCAs. The CDA
established the BCAs at 41 U.S.C. § 607(a) and defined their jurisdiction over federal con-
tract performance disputes at 41 U.S.C. § 607(d). Id. The personnel, rules of procedure,
and decisions of the BCAs are published in the Contractor Appeals Decisions Reporter,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Chicago, IL. 60646. Id. at 65.
12. The Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (2001), establishes the
procedures to be used by contractors and contracting officers in resolving disputes arising
out of and relating to contracts:
The Act contains detailed provisions for handling contract claims by and
against the Government, including (1) certification of contractor claims of
$100,000 or more..., (2) contractor and Government claims as the subject of
a decision of the contracting officer, (3) appeal from a contracting officer's
decision to a Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) within 90 days or to the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims within 12 months of becoming final, (4) appeals
from either the BCAs or the Court of Federal Claims to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, (5) establishment of the BCAs and Administra-
tive Judges (members of the BCAs, (6) Small Claims Procedures and
Accelerated Procedures before the BCAs, (7) payment of interest on claims
to contractors, (8) BCA subpoena power, (9) penalties for submission of
fraudulent claims, and (10) payment of claims.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 123. But see Hicks Corner's Grain Elevator, Inc., 91-3 BCA
(CCH) 24,073 (Ag. B.C.A. 1991) (in a split decision, the Agriculture BCA held that a
"bare" Uniform Grain Storage Agreement standing alone could be an enforceable
contract).
13. The accrual of a claim occurs on the "date when all events, which fix the alleged
liability of either the Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were
known or should have been known. For liability to be fixed, some injury must have oc-
curred. However, monetary damages need not have been incurred." 48 C.F.R. § 33.201.
In government contract law, a claim is:
a written demand or assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a
matter of right, the payment of money, the adjustment or interpretation of
contract terms, or other relief arising under, or relating to the [government]
contract. A claim arising under the contract is a claim that can be resolved
under a contract clause providing for relief sought by the claimant; [whereas]
a claim relating to the contract is one for which no specific contract clause
provides such relief. A written demand or assertion by the contractor seek-
ing payment of money [from the Government] exceeding $100,000 is subject
to the Certification of Claim requirement of the CDA and FAR 33.207.
2002]
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U.S. Court of Federal Claims, for example, would be extremely vulnera-
ble to having its appeal prematurely dismissed via a Rule 12(b)(1) Mo-
tion to Dismiss. 14 In fact, the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims' rules, has been one of the favorite legal
weapons for Federal Government attorneys faced with a claim based
upon a BOA or similar type of agreement. During the relatively short
time-period of March 198415 to March 2000,16 Department of Justice at-
torneys filed more than 222 Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 155 of which were granted by the Federal
Claims Court, 17 and sixty-seven of which were denied.18 Accordingly, by
a winning ratio of approximately two to one, the Department of Justice19
was extremely successful with its 12(b)(1) Motions to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction. It was very successful because its Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction simply pleaded, pursuant to the FAR, that the BOA
in question was not a contract, and therefore the Federal Claims Court or
Board of Contract Appeals lacked CDA jurisdiction because there was
no "express or implied" contract present between the Federal Govern-
ment and the contractor.20 Because the FAR states unequivocally that
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 93.
14. See, e.g., Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 426 (1995) (when
the government requested a dismissal pursuant to its rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction asserting that the Memoranda of Understanding were not enforceable
contracts).
15. Bettini v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 755 (1984).
16. McAfee v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 428 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Vaizburd v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 309 (2000) (granting 12(b)(1) mo-
tion to dismiss since plaintiff had same action pending in other court); Lakewood Assocs.
v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 320 (1999) (granting motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) since
plaintiff's claim was not ripe for judicial review); Chaney v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 309
(1999) (granting motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) since statute of limitations had
run).
18. See, e.g., McAfee v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 428 (2000) (denying motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(1) denied because an express or implied contract existed); Confi-
dential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1 (2000) (denying motion to dismiss under
12(b)(1) because court could not determine if plaintiff could have dealt with a government
agent with implied, actual authority to contract); Bailey v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 187
(2000) (denying motion to bar suit under Rule 12(b)(1) since the operative facts of plain-
tiff's breach of contract claim were not the same as those in the criminal case and associ-
ated forfeiture and accounting for expenses reviews pending before another federal court).
19. The United States Government is the most successful, the most frequent, and the
most important litigant in the federal courts. For example, in fiscal year 1996, the United
States was a party in 48,755 civil cases filed in U.S. District Courts. The responsibility of
defending the United States from CDA and Tucker Act claims, however, falls directly upon
the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice. Over one hundred years
ago, in 1868, Congress gave the Attorney General the responsibility for representing the
United States in all cases brought before the U.S. Court of Claims for any contract, agree-
ment, or transaction with the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of executive de-
partments. After creation of the Department of Justice in 1870, a unit evolved within it
that became known as the Division for the defense of claims against the United States or
the Court of Claims Division. The Attorney General created a new Claims Division in
1933 that consolidated responsibility for most of the litigation areas that compose the pre-
sent day Civil Division. GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION wITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
19-20 (2000).
20. See 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2000).
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BOAs are not contracts, contractors then faced the Herculean task of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that subsequent acts and
circumstances warranted a magical transition from a BOA to an enforcea-
ble contract.21
Part I of this Article above, provided an introduction and overview.
Part II describes the history of the use of BOAs in Government procure-
ment, focusing on representative BOAs such as the: Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MOU), Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Master
Agreement for the Repair and Alteration of Vessels (MARAVs), Uni-
form Grain Storage Agreement (UGSA), and Emergency Equipment
Rental Agreement (EERA). Part II also explains the important role that
BOAs served in Government procurement history. Part III examines the
holdings in Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service,22 Trauma
Service Group v. United States,23 and Total Medical Management, Inc. v.
United States.24 Part III also examines how Trauma Service Group (TSG)
and Total Medical Management (TMM) have modified the law set forth in
Reynolds and made it so much easier for a Federal Government contrac-
tor to overcome a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. Part III additionally
explains in more detail the dismantling of the stricter requirements in
Reynolds, pursuant to the Federal Circuit's decisions in Spruill v. Merit
Systems Protection Board25 and Gould v. United States26 Part IV dis-
cusses National Micrographics Systems, Inc. v. United States27 and McAfee
v. United States,28 two representative U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases
that fully embrace the new holdings in TSG and TMM. Part IV also ana-
lyzes the possible effect TSG and TMM could have on BOAs and their
coverage by the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). 29 Part IV addition-
ally focuses on the "consideration" requirement for BOAs. Part IV dis-
cusses whether "bare" BOAs, which have not been activated by actual
performance, can nevertheless survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Part IV
finally considers some of the FAR and DFARS sections which should be
amended in view of the Federal Circuit's holdings in TSG and TMM.
Part V, the Conclusion, summarizes how helpful TSG and TMM should
be in assisting government contractors to overcome Rule 12(b)(1) Mo-
tions to Dismiss filed by the Government and summarizes the help that
21. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2002).
22. 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that once the Government contests the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, e.g., by filing a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, Appellant "bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction
by a preponderance of the evidence").
23. 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (a well-pled allegation of a contract in the
complaint is sufficient to overcome a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to jurisdiction).
24. 104 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("the law is clear, for the Court of Federal
Claims to have jurisdiction, a valid contract must only be pleaded, not ultimately proven").
25. 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
26. 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
27. 38 Fed. Cl. 46 (1997).
28. 46 Fed. Cl. 428 (2000).
29. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (2002); 41 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2002).
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
TSG and TMM can provide bare BOAs, i.e., BOAs without any actual
performance, to qualify as contracts themselves.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's TSG and TMM decisions will have
extensive and important legal ramifications. These two decisions will go
far to help alleviate the "Catch-22 Chameleon" problem BOAs have
presented in the past, by making it much harder for the Government to
arbitrarily disavow the fact that most BOAs, where the contractor has
started to fulfill its promises under the BOA, can qualify as enforceable
contracts. Further, the Government should be in a much better position
to impose the requirements and sanctions of TINA if BOAs are consid-
ered to be enforceable contracts.
II. BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS: HISTORY, DEFINITION,
AND THE UNIFORM STORAGE GRAIN AGREEMENT
(UGSA), AN IMPORTANT BOA
This part explains the genesis of BOAs, from the French and Indian
War until the end of WWII. It reveals the important role that BOAs have
played in America's procurement history, particularly during periods of
war, and explains the multiple forms BOAs can take. Finally, it discusses
one of the most fascinating modern-day BOAs, the Uniform Grain Stor-
age Agreement (UGSA), the various life stages UGSAs go through
before they reach maturity, and at what stage they can be considered to
be enforceable contracts.
A. THE HISTORY OF BOAs: PROCUREMENT HISTORY LEADING TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS
1. The French and Indian War to the Civil War
During the French and Indian War 30 the British colonial army pur-
chased services and supplies through contractors who were full staff of-
ficers.31 These officers functioned as general contractors, sub-contracting
a variety of tasks.32 The Continental Congress adopted their system when
it established its official procurement structure. 33 At the onset of the Rev-
olutionary War, supply was a paramount problem for Congress because
labor and goods were in short supply.34 In addition, the superior funding
30. The French and Indian War of 1754-63, the last of four North American wars
waged between the British and the French, was a war between England (with the Colonies)
against the French for the right to control the upper Ohio Valley. A victory for the British
would have allowed the traders and settlers from Virginia and Pennsylvania to settle the
Ohio Valley. On the other hand, a victory for the French would have added to their em-
pire in Canada and the Northwest. Both the French and British saw the Ohio Valley as
strategic to the ultimate control over the heart of North America. Colonel George Wash-
ington, who fought with the British, was instrumental in helping the British win the French
and Indian War. JAMES A. HENRETTA, FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR, Microsoft® Encarta®
Online Encyclopedia 2000, at http://encarta.msn.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
31. JAMES F. NAGLE, HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 15 (2d ed. 1999).
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id. at 23-24.
34. Id. at 17.
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of Britain and its colonial loyalists permitted British forces to wage eco-
nomic war as well, by voluntarily paying excessive prices for supplies and
services in the very same markets from which Congress had to buy.35 The
effect of this economic war caused inflationary devaluation of Continen-
tal currency.36 Accordingly, in part because of these wartime exper-
iences, the government became concerned with finding more reasonable
and efficient procurement procedures.37 It was thought that farming out
contracting functions to private enterprise would result in operating sav-
ings to the government. 38 Finally, it was hoped this new less centralized
and more efficient contracting system would result in obtaining better
supplies at lower overall cost to the Continental government.
39
These efficiency and accountability procedures, fostered in part by the
Revolutionary War, endured through the 1850s.40 The Civil War, how-
ever, overburdened the procurement system because both the North and
the South were bidding for the same goods and supplies. The procure-
ment infrastructure of the North lacked experienced officers to oversee
their system, and many new and dishonest civilian appointees conspired
with equally dishonest contractors to cheat the government. 41 On April
13, 1861, two days after the fall of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln mobil-
ized a militia of 75,000 men,42 and on May 3, 1861, by proclamation, he
doubled the size of the Navy, increased the strength of the regular Army
to 22,000 men, and called for 42,000 more volunteers43-making the Civil
War the first war that truly tested our nation's industrial capacity. 44 With
the Harper's Ferry Armory almost totally destroyed and facing an inun-
dation of new recruits, the Federal Government was even forced to utilize
foreign markets to procure arms, 45 demonstrating that equipping the Fed-
eral army was an immense problem of severe urgency46 that unfortu-
nately was exacerbated by rampant profiteering.47
The Civil War saw the Quartermaster Department buying numerous
products, from camp kettles to gunboats; however, each commodity
posed its own problem. The emergency conditions of the Civil War, com-
bined with a concomitant failure to follow procedures, caused both addi-
tional fraud and waste.48 Due to the stress of the Civil War, the failure to
follow procedures became endemic. With the advent of the telegraph
and new mail routes, purchase orders were flowing by telegram and let-
35. Id. at 17-18.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 60.
38. Id. at 48.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 175.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 176.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 175.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 176.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 177.
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ter, as well as by formal contracts. In some instances, a single contractor
would receive all three to effect purchases of its product.49 Accordingly,
the law of contracts was disregarded, and large quantities of supplies
were procured without benefit of being priced until after delivery was
effected,50 a corollary to today's unpriced BOAs. In 1861, Montgomery
Meigs became the Quartermaster General.51 In order to contain cost,
avoid profiteering, and improve efficiency, he developed the genesis of an
umbrella document that contemplated the issuance of future purchase or-
ders. 52 This document was a "standing invitation to manufacturers," 53
but in form it was actually an advertisement for bids, stating that bids
would be opened and a contract awarded within ten days of publication
with the further stipulation that the low bidder would be awarded addi-
tional contracts from time to time. 54 In this manner Meigs attempted to
contain the price inflation he assumed would occur if he advertised or
placed large orders. 55
2. Immediately After the Civil War
At the end of the Civil War the military demobilized very quickly.56
The War Department bureaus were instructed to reduce spending to ab-
solute minimum levels "in view of an immediate reduction of forces in
the field and garrison and the speedy termination of hostilities. '57 Gov-
ernment contracting diminished to the point where some industries, such
as gun manufacturers, became virtually bankrupt, while other manufac-
turers more adaptable to civilian life, such as shoe manufacturers pros-
pered by turning their skills developed in wartime to the civilian
market.58 This slowdown in government purchases permitted the govern-
ment to return to centralized purchasing,59 and permitted a re-examina-
tion of the variety of contract clauses used by various departments. In
1878, the first rules to promote uniformity were promulgated by the Sec-
retary of War.60
Subsequently, the Mexican War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer
Rebellion, and the Spanish American War created the same furious con-
tracting activity as had the outset of the Civil War.61 Technology, how-
ever, had changed the nature of industrial build-up. Beef, for example,
was no longer delivered on the hoof; rather, it was delivered in refriger-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 193.
51. Id. at 189.




56. Id. at 215.
57. ARMSTRONG, BULLETS AND BUREAUCRATS, THE MACHINE GUN AND THE
UNITED STATES ARMY, 1861-1916, 1943 (Greenwood Press 1982).
58. See NAGLE, supra note 45, at 215-21.
59. Id. at 220.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 241-42.
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ated train cars directly to rail sidings by new packing companies, such as
Armour and Swift. 62 A new umbrella document was created called the
"depot commissary order." Meat packers received these "umbrella or-
ders" for carloads, and even trainloads of meat, and Army regiments
drew directly from the rail cars at the depot.63
The turn of the twentieth century saw renewed interest in centraliza-
tion and standardization of contracting. The General Supply Committee,
which replaced the Dockery Commission's Board of Awards, began the
standardization process in 1913.64 It promulgated a standard solicitation
form, a standard contract form, and a standard bond.65 Approximately
1,200 copies of this precursor to the Federal Acquisition Regulation were
printed. The General Supply Committee and the Treasury continued to
plead for more centralization, but World War I intervened.66 The Na-
tional Defense Act of 1916, perhaps the most comprehensive piece of
military legislation, incorporated almost word for word the recommenda-
tions of the Army War College study on military procurement policy. In-
cluded within was the recommendation, "[t]hat the president be
empowered to place an order with any firm for any product usually pro-
duced or capable of being produced by such firm." 67
3. World War I and the Blanket Order-An Umbrella for Formal
Occasions
This umbrella, the "Blanket Order," was in use in private industry as
early as 1916.68 It specified terms pertaining to future orders, e.g., it
might specify the price and total quantity but not the exact amount to be
ordered of each variation contemplated under the Blanket Order, which
could vary based on requirements. 69 This embodiment of the umbrella
document gained fuller expression during World War 1.70 Williamson
Heater Co. v. United States is an illustrative case regarding a blanket or-
der just prior to the end of World War I hostilities.71 In Williamson, the
62. Id. at 243.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 254.
65. Id. at 254-55.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 270-71.
68.
Blanket orders for shoes, to be filled several months later, given by a dealer
to a manufacturer and accepted, which specified the styles of shoes and the
kind of leather, number of pairs, and price of each style, held to constitute
binding contracts, though the sizes and widths were left to be specified later,
in accordance with the custom of the trade .... The complaint alleges that
between June 1, 1916, and November 1 of the same year, the Macdonald &
Kiley Company sold and delivered to the defendant shoes of the reasonable
value and agreed price of $38,143.61.
Carroll v. Melville Shoe Corp., 272 F. 49, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1921).
69. Id.
70. Williamson Heater Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 63 (1923) (commencing of per-
formance of the BOA created an enforceable contract).
71. Id. at 64.
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Government issued a blanket order contemplating the purchase of one
thousand furnaces, without obligation to itself, to be effected by
purchase orders or requisitions.72 It issued an order for 480 of the fur-
naces only three days before the end of World War I; the Government
then refused to purchase the ordered furnaces. 73 The contractor ap-
pealed to the Board of Contract Adjustment of the War Department that
denied an agreement had been formed obligating the government to pay
for its order of 480 furnaces.74 The United States Court of Claims held
that, under the Dent Act and the facts of the case (including the issuance
of a purchase order and the commencement of performance by the con-
tractor), an agreement binding the Government was in fact created.75
On June 10, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order
6166 abolishing the General Supply Committee and substituting the Pro-
curement Division in its place. 76 The Procurement Division supervised
virtually all procurement, but permitted the military services to do their
own contracting, subject to forms and regulations promulgated by that
division.77 During the period between 1933 and 1939, the Procurement
Division established a new umbrella document, the "General Schedule of
Supplies," allowing executive departments to place purchase orders
under this expansive document. 78
4. World War II, the President Takes Over and the Use of Letters of
Intent
Immediately after Pearl Harbor was bombed on December 7, 1941,
Congress enacted the First War Powers Act authorizing the President to
award government contracts without regard to the usual attendant provi-
72. Id. at 70.
73. The Dent Act, ch. 92, 40 Stat. 1272 (1919), was enacted in response to a decision by
the Comptroller of the Treasury, which denied termination settlements for certain "infor-
mal" wartime contracts (i.e., contracts awarded hastily without full observation of procure-
ment regulations). See 25 Comp. Dec. 398 (1918). The Dent Act authorized the Secretary
of War to compensate contractors under wartime agreements, however informally exe-
cuted, but prohibited recovery of anticipatory profits.
74. Williamson Heater Co., 58 Ct. Cl. at 71.
75. Id.
76. See NAGLE, supra note 31, at 358.
77. Id.
78. The Procurement Division "established a General Schedule of Supplies from
which the executive departments could order. The departments could buy outside the
General Schedule of Supplies if it did not include an item or if an emergency existed. The
division continued the standardization of forms begun by the IBCA." Id. President
Roosevelt's Director's Order No. 73, approved on June 10, 1939,
immeasurably strengthened the Procurement Division. Although it ex-
empted the War and Navy Departments and the Marine Corps, it directed
that the division "shall hereafter undertake the performance of procurement
of all supplies [expansively defined] for use either at the seat of government
or in the field." More importantly, it provided the division with an infra-
structure to fulfill the expanded role. It transferred "all records and property
pertaining to, or utilized in, the procurement of supplies by any agency, and




sions of law.79 Pursuant to subsequent executive orders, the President
delegated his plenary government contract powers to, inter alia, the War
and Naval secretaries, the Maritime Commission, the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Works Agency. 80
Through these various executive agencies, the Government feverishly
awarded contracts for supplies and services without adequately consider-
ing prices, often by using unpriced letters of intent. 81 These letters of
intent, which were simply preliminary understandings that the parties in-
tended to enter upon a contract, 82 were therefore not contracts them-
selves. These letters of intent were used extensively by the Government
during the entire World War II period.83 For example, during the first
four months of 1942, the Navy made commitments of $8.4 billion, of
which $5.3 billion were accomplished by letters of intent.84
During the first half of 1942, the Government awarded more than $100
billion in contracts, sometimes even surpassing its ability to pay.85 To
handle the chaotic rush for procurement contracts, the President created
the new War Production Board (WPB) in 1942 and the Office of War
Mobilization in 1943.86 The latter agency was created to handle the cha-
otic government procurement problem for the remainder of World War
11.87
Accordingly, BOAs and similar instruments have played a pivotal role
in shaping our present government procurement system, as reflected in
today's FAR and DFARS. This historical government-procurement
learning experience taught our nation, sometimes through the college of
hard knocks, the shortcomings as well as the positive attributes of BOAs
and similar instruments such as the letters of intent.
B. THE DEFINITION OF BOAs
Because the FAR88 uses the term "instrument of understanding" to de-
fine a BOA, 89 it is important to determine what this more generic term
encompasses. A search of the United States Code Annotated revealed
no occurrences of the term "instrument of understanding" (IOU). West's
Supreme Court database indicated that the Supreme Court had never
79. NAGLE, supra note 31, at 409.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 410.
82. NAGLE, supra note 31, at 26.
83. NAGLE, supra note 31, at 410.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 410, 412.
87. Id. at 412.
88. The FAR has been defined as the primary document in the Federal Acquisition
Regulations System, containing uniform policies and procedures that govern the acquisi-
tion activity of all federal agencies. The GSA has made the FAR available on the Internet
at http://www.arnet.gov/far. Other Internet sites where the FAR can be found include:
http://www.farsite.hill.af.mil (Hill AFB site); and http://www.fedmarket.com (The Federal
Marketplace commercial site). NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 235.
89. 48 C.F.R. § 8.405-2 (2001).
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used the term; neither had the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The Court of Federal Claims (as the Claims Court) has used the phrase
only twice,90 each time merely quoting the FAR definition of a basic or-
dering agreement as a written "instrument of understanding." The vari-
ous Boards of Contract Appeals have done likewise in just four
instances. 91 However, none of the sources above has attempted to pro-
vide a definition of the metes and bounds of an "instrument of under-
standing." Even The Government Contracts Reference Book92 does not
include "instrument of understanding" within its pages. "Instrument,"
however, is defined, in its broadest sense, to be any writing produced for
its evidentiary value.93 It is further defined as any writing that memorial-
izes an act or agreement, or one that gives evidence of a right to the
payment of money.94 Looking at the second term, an "understanding," in
the law of contracts, 95 is an agreement. It is a valid contract, particularly
if accompanied by an expression to show that it represents a meeting of
the minds of the parties. 96 In this manner, an "understanding" that is
memorialized in an "instrument" would be a contract.
In a federal procurement setting, an oral understanding that anticipates
finalization in written form is not a contract because the lack of a writing
indicates a lack of mutual intent to form a binding contract. 97 Further,
the United States cannot enforce an oral agreement against a contrac-
90. Almar Indus., Inc. v. United States, 16 C. Ct. 243, 245-46 (1989); W. Pioneer, Inc.
v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 291, 297 (1985).
91. Petersen Equip., 95-2 BCA (CCH) 27,676 (Ag. B.C.A. 1995); Russell L. Kisling,
88-2 BCA (CCH) 20,825 (Ag. B.C.A. 1988). Gen. Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat Div., 83-2
BCA (CCH) T 16,907 (A.S.B.C.A. 1983). McDonnell Douglas Corp., 75-1 BCA (CCH) 1
11,337 (N.A.S.A. B.C.A. 1975).
92. NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 243.
93. It is a written document satisfying the requisites of negotiability prescribed by
U.C.C. article 3.
94. U.C.C. § 3-104 defines "negotiable instrument" and UCC § 8-102 defines "secur-
ity" and other writings that evidence a right to the payment of money. See, e.g., Moore v.
Diamond Dry Goods. Co., 54 P.2d 553, 554 (Ariz. 1936). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 154 (6th ed. 1999) ("bearer instrument"); id. at 164 ("bill"); id. at 271 ("commercial
paper"): id. at 1035-36 ("negotiable instrument").
95. Black's Law Dictionary defines "understanding" as follows:
in the law of contracts, an agreement. An implied agreement resulting from
the express terms of another agreement, whether written or oral. An infor-
mal agreement, or a concurrence as to its terms. A valid contract engage-
ment of a somewhat informal character. This is a loose and ambiguous term,
unless it is accompanied by some expression to show that it constituted a
meeting of the minds of parties upon something respecting which they in-
tended to be bound.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (6th ed. 1990). See also id. at 67 ("agreement"); id. at
322-23 ("contract").
96. Id.
97. According to the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1932) and CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 30 (1963), oral understandings contemplating the finalization of legal obligations
in a written document are not themselves actual contracts. The oral understandings must
first be contracts before they are enforceable. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 595 F.
2d 595, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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tor,98 nor may a contractor enforce one against the United States.99 As-
suming that an "understanding" between the United States and a
contractor possesses all the required elements of a federal procurement
contract, it must be memorialized in a writing to be enforceable as such
against the United States.100 Thus, a federal procurement contract is an
understanding embodied in an instrument and would therefore be an "in-
strument of understanding." However, only "instruments of understand-
ing" that satisfy the statutory and common-law requirements for a
procurement contract will attain contract status.101
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) discloses the existence of five
IOUs. They are, in order of appearance: the Standing Ordering Agree-
ment 02 (SOA), the Basic Agreement 10 3 (BA), the Basic Ordering Agree-
ment 10 4 (BOA), the Master Agreement for Repair and Alteration of
Vessels 10 5 (MARAV), and the Interagency Support Agreement (ISA).10 6
The CFR only uses the term IOU to label the five agreements. It makes
no further mention of IOUs. It does not include any other agreements as
IOUs, but does not exclude any other agreements. It does not define the
term, but merely designates these five agreements as members of the
class of "instruments of understanding." Among the five CFR-denomi-
nated IOUs, only the ISA does not require a government contractor to be
a party to the agreement. 10 7 While existing within the procurement set-
98. The D.C. Circuit has held as follows:
The issue before this court is limited to the question whether the CCC, a
government agency, can obtain damages for an unperformed oral contract
for carriage. We believe that both the relevant statutes and regulations re-
quire that government contracts such as the charter agreement here be writ-
ten in order to be enforceable by the Government. Hence, in answer to the
certified question we hold that this oral contract is unenforceable.
United States v. Am. Renaissance Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1501(a) states in pertinent part that "[a]n amount shall be recorded
as an obligation of the United States Government only when supported by documentary
evidence of... a binding agreement between an agency and another person... that is...
in writing, in a way and form, and for a purpose authorized by law .... " The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has held "that government contracts of this type [must] be in
writing, and that contracts which are merely oral are not enforceable." Am. Renaissance
Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d at 1062. The United States Court of Claims also has held that "[t]o
the extent that plaintiff's contract is based on an express oral contract, it fails on the addi-
tional ground that it violated the statutory requirements that an agreement be in writing in
order to bind the government." Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 3 CI. Ct. 373, 377 n.5 (1983).
100. Prestex, Inc., 3 Cl. Ct. at 377.
101. See Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Total
Med. Mgmt. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
102. 41 C.F.R. § 101-37.100 (2000) (defined within definition of "rental aircraft").
103. 48 C.F.R. § 16.702 (2000).
104. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2000).
105. 48 C.F.R. § 217.7101 (2000).
106. 48 C.F.R. § 842.101 (2000).
107. A standing ordering agreement "is a written instrument of understanding, negoti-
ated between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and contractor .... " 41
C.F.R. § 101-37.100 (2000). A basic agreement "is a written instrument of understanding,
negotiated between an agency or contracting activity and a contractor . . . ." 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.702 (2000). A basic ordering agreement "is a written instrument of understanding,
negotiated between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and a contractor
. ...." 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2000). A master agreement for repair and alteration of vessels
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ting,10 8 the ISA is executed between two federal agencies or contract ac-
tivities, 10 9 not between a contractor and the Government. Further, the
ISA, while not stated to be a contract, is required to specify the rights and
obligations of the parties, as well as the funding and reimbursement ar-
rangements.110 In contrast, the FAR states that the BA,1 1 the BOA,11 2
and the MARAV113 are not contracts.
The Code of Federal Regulations' IOUs share common elements.
First, the SOA, the BA, the BOA, and the MARAV are negotiated be-
tween a contractor and the government, and each anticipates the possibil-
ity, but not the necessity, of the placement of future orders. Second, they
contain clauses, terms, and conditions that would be applicable to any
future orders or contracts between the parties.114 The ISA, however, has
the earmarks of a contract.1' 5 While the SOA, BA, BOA, and MARAV
contemplate the issuance of future orders, which would become contracts
"is a written instrument of understanding, negotiated between a contracting activity and a
contractor .... 48 C.F.R. § 217.7101 (2000).
108.
Pursuant to FAR policy encouraging interagency cross-servicing in field-con-
tract support services, contracting officers of the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs will utilize the support services of other agencies to the extent feasible.
Examples of such services are: preaward surveys; quality assurance and tech-
nical inspection of contract items; and review of contractors' procurement
systems. Requirements for support services available from any other Gov-
ernment department or agency will be obtained on the basis of an approved
negotiated interagency support agreement.
48 C.F.R. § 842.101(a) (2000).
109.
An interagency support agreement is a written instrument of understanding
executed between the parties to the agreement. The agreement should state
clearly the accord which has been reached between the two parties involved,
especially the obligations assumed by the rights granted each. The agree-
ment will be specific with respect to resources to be provided by both the
supplying and receiving activities. It will also provide for funding and reim-
bursement arrangements, and clauses permitting revisions, modifications
thereto, or cancellation thereof, will be included.
48 C.F.R. § 842.101(b) (2000).
110. Id.
111. "A basic agreement is not a contract." 48 C.F.R. § 16.702(a)(2) (2000).
112. "A basic ordering agreement is not a contract." 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a)(3) (2000).
113. "Master agreement for repair and alteration of vessels ... [i]s not a contract." 48
C.F.R. § 217.7101(a)(2) (2000).
114. "[A] standing ordering agreement ... is a written instrument of understanding,
negotiated between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and contractor
that contains: (1) terms and clauses applying to future contracts (orders) between parties
during its term..." 41 CFR § 101-37.100 (2000). "A basic agreement is a written instru-
ment of understanding, negotiated between an agency or contracting activity and a con-
tractor, that (1) contains contract clauses applying to future contracts between the parties
during its term .... " 48 C.F.R. § 16.702(a) (2000). "A basic ordering agreement is a
written instrument of understanding, negotiated between an agency, contracting activity, or
contracting office and a contractor, that contains (1) terms and clauses applying to future
contracts (orders) between the parties during its term .... " 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2000).
"Master agreement for repair and alteration of vessels-(1) Is a written instrument of un-
derstanding, negotiated between a contracting activity and a contractor that-(A) Con-
tains contract clauses, terms, and conditions applying to future contracts for repairs,
alterations, and/or additions to vessels .... 48 C.F.R. § 217.7101 (2000).
115. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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pursuant to an identifiable IOU, 116 the ISA seems to be pertinent only to
itself.117 It does, however, anticipate future revision, modification, and
cancellation 118 and could, in theory, provide for future orders, merely by
revision or modification, or provide no order at all by cancellation. Thus,
within the context of the CFR, an "instrument of understanding" is a
writing produced to evidence a negotiated meeting of the minds of the
parties, generally a contracting officer and a government contractor, re-
garding the terms of potential future purchase orders.
C. SOME REPRESENTATIVE IOUs NOT DENOMINATED AS SUCH BY
THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR)
1. Federal Supply Schedules
The General Services Administration (GSA) awards Federal Supply
Schedules (FSS), also known as GSA schedules, which are used to
purchase a wide variety of commonly used services and supplies.119
While discussed in the CFR, they are not referred to as "instruments of
understanding." GSA Schedules are negotiated,1 20 indefinite delivery
contracts awarded to private contractors, fixing at least the price terms
for future agency purchase (delivery) orders within a given period of
116. "[Sjtanding ordering agreement ... contains.., methods for pricing, issuing, and
delivering future orders." 41 C.F.R. § 101-37.100 (2000). "A basic agreement ... contem-
plates separate future contracts that will incorporate by reference or attachment the re-
quired and applicable clauses agreed upon in the basic agreement." 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.702(a)(2) (2000). "A basic ordering agreement... contains.., methods for pricing,
issuing, and delivering future orders under the basic ordering agreement." 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.703(a)(3) (2000). "Master agreement for repair and alteration of vessels . . .
[c]ontemplates separate future contracts that will incorporate by reference or attachment
the required and applicable clauses agreed upon in the master agreement." 48 C.F.R.
§ 217.7101(a)(1)(B) (2000).
117. See supra text accompanying note 3.
118. Id.
119. This includes both Single Award Schedules (SAS) and Multiple Award Schedules
(MAS) as established in the FAR and the FPM. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 8.401 to 8.404-3, 38.101,
38.201 (2000) (FAR); 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-26.000 to 101-26.49040416 (2000) (FPM). This pro-
cess permits contracting officers, following competitive procedures, to award Indefinite
Delivery Contracts to commercial firms, requiring such firms to provide, under "schedule"
specified supplies and services at stated prices for given periods of time. This allows order-
ing offices to issue delivery orders directly to listed contractors, receive direct shipments,
make payment directly to contractors, and administer the orders. NASH ET AL., supra note
1, at 243.
120. 48 C.F.R. § 538.270 lists several acceptable reasons why the Government is at all
times seeking to obtain the offeror's best price, which it defines as "the best price given to
the most favored customer," but concedes that the Government might not always receive
the best price. It goes on to state that:
You may award a contract containing pricing which is less favorable than the
best price the offeror extends to any commercial customer for similar
purchases if you make a determination that both of the following conditions
exists: (1) The prices offered to the Government are fair and reasonable,
even though comparable discounts were not negotiated. (2) Award is other-




time. 121 While GSA Schedules are considered contracts, no quantity
term is specified, either in terms of individual orders or ultimate total.
GSA Schedules are not even limited to the use of the GSA, but rather
specify other agencies as mandatory users as well.122 Purchase is not
even limited to a single contractor, but instead should be made from the
schedule contractor offering the best value for the scheduled item.123 As
such, GSA Schedules anticipate the possibility, but not the requirement,
of an award of future orders to any given schedule contractor, and they
contain clauses, terms, and conditions that would be applicable to those
future orders. Further, they are written instruments, 124 which evidence a
meeting of the minds of the parties respecting the terms of future
purchase orders. 125 The various Boards of Contract Appeals seem to ac-
cept without question that a Federal Supply Schedule is a contract. 126
121.
The Federal Supply Schedule program, directed and managed by the General
Services Administration (GSA), provides Federal agencies with a simplified
process for obtaining commonly used commercial supplies and services at
prices associated with volume buying .... Indefinite delivery contracts (in-
cluding requirements contracts) are established with commercial firms to
provide supplies and services at stated prices for given periods of time.
48 C.F.R. § 8.401(a).
122.
Ordering procedures for mandatory use schedules. (1) This paragraph (c)
applies only to orders against schedule contracts with mandatory users.
When ordering from multiple-award schedules, mandatory users shall also
follow the procedures in [48 C.F.R. § 8.404(a) & (b)].
(2) In the case of mandatory schedules, ordering offices shall not solicit bids,
proposals, quotations, or otherwise test the market solely for the purpose of
seeking alternative sources to Federal Supply Schedules.
(3) Schedules identify executive agencies required to use them as mandatory
sources of supply. The single-award schedule shall be used as a primary
source and the multiple-award schedule as a secondary source ....
48 C.F.R. § 8.404(c)(1)-(3).
123. 48 C.F.R. § 8.404(b)(2) states that orders should be placed with the schedule con-
tractor that can provide the supply or service that represents the best value. According to
48 C.F.R. § 38.102-2(b), GSA is to use MAS contracts when "(1) it is not practical to draft
specifications or other descriptions for the required supplies or services and there are mul-
tiple suppliers able to furnish similar commercial supplies or services; or (2) selectivity is
necessary for ordering offices to meet their varying needs." It was decided in Best Power
Technology Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1174 (Fed Cir. 1993), that "[a]n agency
can choose, from the MAS, the supply or service with the features it needs and purchase
that supply or service on the terms that GSA has previously negotiated with the particular
manufacturer or supplier."
124. "The contracting officer shall use the Standard Form 1449, Solicitation/Contract/
Order for Commercial Items, if (1) the acquisition is expected to exceed the simplified
acquisition threshold; (2) a paper solicitation or contract is being issued; and (3) proce-
dures at 12.603 are not being used. Use of the SF 1449 is nonmandatory but encouraged
for commercial acquisitions not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold." 48 C.F.R.
§ 12.204 (a). "Except when quotations are solicited via FACNET, electronically, or orally,
the SF 1449; SF 18, Request for Quotations; or an agency form/automated format may be
used. Each agency request for quotations form/automated format should conform with the
SF 18 or SF 1449 to the maximum extent practicable." 48 C.F.R. §13.307(b)(1).
125. See supra note 3.
126. Ordinarily, an FSS contract is identifiable as such because of the existence of a
supply schedule covering articles and services. Syst. Dev. Corp., 75-1 BCA (CCH) T1
11,304 (Ag. B.C.A. 1975). The government, as a contracting party, is the sovereign acting
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The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has dealt with the subject of the Fed-
eral Supply Schedule Contract (FSSC) on thirteen occasions without
questioning their validity as contracts. 127 In no instance has it held that a
Federal Supply Schedule Contract is not a valid contract for jurisdictional
purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has apparently
concurred in the assumption.128
2. Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA)
The Blanket Purchase Agreement is used when "[t]here is a wide vari-
ety of items in a broad class of supplies or services that are generally
purchased, but the exact items, quantities, and delivery requirements are
not known in advance and may vary considerably.' 29 The BPA is pre-
pared on a standard form and anticipates the future purchase of supplies
by issuance of electronic or written order on an SF 1449 or OF 347,130 or
by written purchase requisition, 31 with private contractors on charge ac-
counts. 132 An electronic order is considered the equivalent of a written
order, and is now preferred for the ordering of small quantities of sup-
as if it were a private party, making promises which it represents are binding and
enforceable.
127. "Indefinite delivery contracts (including requirements contracts) are established
with commercial firms to provide supplies and services at stated prices for given periods of
time." 48 C.F.R. § 8.401(a). A second technique of procurement is the purchase on an
indefinite-quantity basis under formally advertised, competitively awarded 'requirements'
contracts or (since 1968) under multiple-award, separately negotiated contracts, of items
used on a recurring basis by the Government which are to be shipped directly from the
manufacturer to the ordering agency. The GSA enters into a procurement contract for
these items on an indefinite-quantity basis and then an ordering agency places an order
against such contract directly with the manufacturer.
128. The procurement contemplates placing a task order with a GSA FSS with the use
of Schedule 874, "Management, Organization, and Business Improvement Services"
(MOBIS). GSA has separate contracts with various vendors which are listed on "sched-
ules" for different goods and services. Part 8 of FAR addresses procurements made pursu-
ant to Federal Supply Schedules that are managed by the GSA.
129. 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-2 (2001).
130. "Both SF 1449 and OF 347, Order for Supplies or Services, are multipurpose forms
used for negotiated purchases of supplies or services, delivery or task orders, inspection
and receiving reports, and invoices. An agency form/automated format also may be used."
48 C.F.R. § 13.307(b)(2) (2001).
131. 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-5(e) (2001) limits the documentation of purchases to essential
information and forms by stating that purchases generally should be made electronically,
but when it is not considered economical or practical to use electronic methods, oral orders
will be allowed. A paper purchase document may then be issued if it is necessary to ensure
that the purchaser and supplier agree on essential elements concerning the transaction. If
a paper document is not issued, then the essential elements of the purchase are to be
memorialized in either an informal memorandum, or on a form developed locally for this
purpose with the pertinent purchase requisitions and the accounting, along with appropria-
tion data all being cited.
132. 48 C.F.R. § 13.303 discusses simplified methods of filling the Government's antici-
pated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing charge accounts with quali-
fied sources of supply. The design of BPAs reduces administrative costs by accomplishing
simplified acquisitions through the elimination of the need for individual purchase docu-
ments. They have to contain a description of the agreement, the extent of the obligation,
pricing, a purchase limitation, notice of individuals authorized to purchase, dollar limita-
tions, delivery tickets, and invoices. The FAR restricts individual purchases under BPAs
not to exceed the dollar limitation for simplified acquisitions, and also states the existence
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plies. 133 It is required by regulation to contain terms and conditions ap-
plicable to those potential future orders. 134 Like a GSA Schedule, BPAs
may be established with more than one contractor, 135 and it is possible
that a contractor may receive no actual orders under the BPA. Under a
BPA, however, the government is not obligated to make any purchase
whatsoever from any particular contractor. 136 Thus, the BPA is a written
instrument evidencing agreement between the government and a contrac-
tor regarding terms pertaining to potential future orders for supplies.
Boards of Contract Appeals have considered the BPA on numerous
occasions. As a rule they have not found the BPA to be a contract,137
with one exception found in Graves Excavating,138 where the Forest Ser-
vice used the contractor's excavator for 676 hours pursuant to a BPA and
a subsequent task order for 740 hours. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims
has considered the subject of the BPA only once. It did not deal with the
BPA umbrella standing alone but rather with the combination of a BPA
and subsequent "calls" (orders). It treated this combination as a con-
tract. 139 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has never
discussed the subject of the BPA.140
of a BPA does not justify sole source purchasing. See 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-3 (2001). See also
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 63.
133. 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-5(e)(1) (2001).
134. 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-2(c)(1) (2001).
135. "BPAs may be established with- (1) More than one supplier for supplies or ser-
vices of the same type to provide maximum practicable competition ... ." Id.
136. "The following terms and conditions are mandatory .... A statement that the
Government is obligated only to the extent of authorized purchases actually made under
the BPA." 48 C.F.R. § 13.303-3(a)(2) (2001).
137. The BPA contains none of the requisites that would create a requirements con-
tract. It lacks mutuality of consideration. See, e.g., Dr. Chauncey L. Duren d/b/a Chesa-
peake Orthopedics, 90-1 BCA (CCH) $ 22,386 (A.S.B.C.A. 1989). Neither party is
assuming any duty towards the other. See, e.g., Julian Freeman, 94-3 BCA (CCH) 27,280
(A.S.B.C.A. 1994). "A blanket purchase agreement is not a contract. It is merely a collec-
tion of provisions that will only mature into a contract or contracts at such time or times as
individual purchase orders may be issued by the government through authorized ordering
officers and accepted by the contractor." Potomac Computers Unlimited, Inc., 94-1 BCA
(CCH) T 26,304 (D.O.T.C.A.B. 1993).
138. This involved a blanket purchase agreement (call-when-needed equipment rental),
Contract No. 45-03J1-8-0067. The contractor argued that it was an indefinite quantity re-
quirements contract and the court agreed with the contractor. The contractor was required
to provide services whenever a "call" for such service was made by the Government. The
Government quality-assurance representative who was specifically authorized to make
such calls made the calls orally and in person. The agreement provided that the Govern-
ment was only obligated to pay for work performed pursuant to calls made under the
agreement with the contractor being obligated to perform all work necessary to accomplish
"on-call" services during the period of the agreement. Graves Excavating, AGBCA No.
1999-193-1 (Ag. B.C.A. 1999), available at 1999 WL 962478.
139.
Therefore, because United Sales was fully paid on call numbers M26A and
M27A of Blanket Purchase Agreement N00189-86-A-7510, if plaintiff United
Sales has a legitimate claim against the government regarding the $91,000.00
withheld, it must be on a contract or contracts other than the one which is the
subject of the contracting officer's November 23, 1987 opinion, and the sub-
ject of the instant lawsuit.
United Sales, Inc. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 88, 97 (1995).
140. A search of the Westlaw "CTAP" database revealed no such cases.
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3. Emergency Equipment Rental Agreement (EERA)
The EERA is a written agreement1 41 that has been used by the Forest
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to obtain vehicles and
equipment to fight forest fires. 142 The Agriculture Board of Contract
Appeals (AGBCA) has stated that standing alone, the EERA is not a
contract. 143 Prepared on a standard form, 44 it contains negotiated terms,
such as payment rates, 45 which apply to future indeterminate orders for
equipment.' 46 While it may appear odd that only the Agriculture Board
of Contract Appeals has heard cases respecting the EERA,147 this is re-
ally not surprising because the Forest Service is one of the agencies sub-
sumed under the Department of Agriculture.
4. The CHAMPUS1 48 Memorandum of Understanding
Within today's managed care medical environment, a CHAMPUS ben-
eficiary may only use an "authorized" provider. 149 A CHAMPUS au-
thorized provider becomes a preferred provider for referral purposes by
141. This agreement contains the Federal General Provisions for Emergency Rental
Agreement Form OF-294. See, e.g., Thomas B. Prescott. 00-1 BCA (CCH) 30,583 (Ag.
B.C.A. 1999).
142. Erick and Nicole Ammon, 2000-137-1 (Ag. B.C.A. 2000); Thomas B. Prescott, 00-1
BCA (CCH) 30,722 (Ag. B.C.A. 1999); Pepper Hewitt, AGBCA No. 99-110-1 (Ag.
B.C.A. 1998); Special Operations Group, AGBCA No. 98-166-2 (Ag. B.C.A. 1998); John
E. Martin, Jr., 92-2 BCA (CCH) 25,016 (Ag. B.C.A. 1992).
143. In Thomas Prescott, 00-1 BCA (CCH) T 30,583 (Ag. B.C.A 1999), the Board found
an EERA standing alone is not a contract. Its mere existence places no legal obligation on
the Government to order any supplies or services and likewise does not obligate the non-
government party to provide them if ordered. The Board went on to say that if supplies or
services were ordered and delivered then an express contract incorporating the terms of
the EERA came into being. Id. The Board in Petersen Equipment, 95-2 BCA (CCH)
27,676 (Ag. B.C.A. 1995), also concurred and expressed its agreement with the Govern-
ment that EERAs were not contracts, but "merely a collection of terms, conditions, and
prices that were to become applicable when and if the Forest Service requested emergency
supplies and equipment and Appellant agreed to provide them."
144. Petersen Equip., 95-2 BCA (CCH) § 27,676.
145. These rates of payments include all operator expenses, work rates, special rates,
guarantees, daily rates, various exceptions to all the above, manner of determining pay,
and method of payment. Other exceptions include contractors withdrawing equipment
prior to being released by Government. The Government's assumption of risk is outlined
with specific exceptions. See, e.g., Thomas Prescott, 00-1 BCA (CCH) 30,583.
146. Since the equipment needs of the Government and availability of any contractor's
equipment during an emergency cannot be determined in advance, it is usually agreed that
the contractor shall furnish the specified equipment when the Government's needs arise in
the future hereon to the extent the contractor is willing and able at the time of order. See
id. "On May 18, 1996, the parties executed EERA No. 56-9A40-6-1P045 which provided
for the possible future rental, with driver, of Prescott's 1988 Ford pickup truck and another
truck for use by the FS in the event needed to fight fires." Id.
147. A search of the Westlaw databases "FGC-BCA," "FEDCL," and "CTAF" reveals
only Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals cases with no mention of cases at the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
148. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services. 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.1-.22 (2002).
149. "Provider required. In order to be considered for benefits, all services and sup-
plies shall be rendered by, prescribed by, or furnished at the direction of, or on the order of
a CHAMPUS-authorized provider practicing within the scope of his or her license." 32
C.F.R. § 199.6(a)(7) (2002).
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executing a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with the Director
of CHAMPUS of the Department of Defense (DOD). 150 In considera-
tion of promotion of efficiencies inherent in the use of preferred provid-
ers, the DOD Secretary may enter into resource sharing agreements with
preferred providers that require the Military Treatment Facility Com-
mander to furnish treatment facilities within which to treat CHAMPUS
beneficiaries to preferred providers. 15 1 These resource sharing agree-
ments are typically incorporated within the MOU. The MOU's provi-
sions respecting claim payments come into play only when a CHAMPUS
beneficiary presents a CHAMPUS ID Card and requests service. 152 It is
an umbrella document which furnishes the terms and conditions of the
provision of service under the "order" created by the presentation of a
valid CHAMPUS ID along with a request for service.
5. The Uniform Grain Storage Agreement (UGSA): An Important
IOU/BOA Not Specifically Described in FAR
The UGSA is an important IOU/BOA because it goes through almost
the same stages as a normal BOA. 153 Its importance, its complexity, and
its chameleon-like features have nurtured a surprising share of litigation
in the federal courts and the Boards. In the federal courts, there have
been at least sixty-nine appeals on the multitudinous issues that have
arisen under a UGSA.1 54 In the Boards, however, only the Agriculture
Board of Contract Appeals has had to grapple with these issues. This is
understandable because the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) that
administers the UGSAs is an agency subsumed under the Department of
Agriculture. 155 The ubiquitous and complex nature of UGSAs' interpre-
tative problems is evidenced by the number of appellate courts that have
attempted to interpret the ambiguities of the UGSA: (1) U.S. Court of
150. "The Director, OCHAMPUS, or designee, may include in a participating provider
agreement/MOU provisions ... which encourage provider participation while improving
beneficiary access to benefits and contributing to CHAMPUS efficiency. Such provisions
shall be otherwise allowed by this part or by DOD Directive." 32 C.F.R.
§ 199.6(a)(8)(ii)(A) (2002).
151. "The Secretary of Defense, or designee, may enter into an agreement (external or
internal) providing for the sharing of resources between facilities of the uniformed services
and facilities of a civilian health care provider... if [he] determines that such an agreement
would result in the delivery of health care in a more effective, efficient or economical
manner." 32 C.F.R. § 199.1(p) (2002).
152. 32 C.F.R. § 199.3 (2002) requires a patient to present his or her applicable
CHAMPUS identification card (Uniformed Services identification card) to an authorized
provider of care. This card identifies the holder of the card to be an eligible CHAMPUS
beneficiary.
153. For a discussion of these stages, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
154. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding the Depart-
ment of Agriculture liable under the Federal Torts Claims Act when it converted grain
stored by the plaintiffs under a UGSA); United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co.,
476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding that grain storage operators violated price support
payment guidelines in a cooperative grain storage plan set up under CCC); Farmers Eleva-
tor Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Milam Co., 435 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding grain warehouse-
man liable loss in quality and quantity of grain stored under a UGSA).
155. See, e.g., Farmers Elevator Co., 98-1 BCA 29, 447 (Ag. B.C.A. 1998).
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Appeals of the Federal Circuit;156 (2) Second Circuit;157 (3) Fifth Cir-
cuit;158 (4) Sixth Circuit;159 (5) Seventh Circuit;160 (6) Eighth Circuit;161
(7) Tenth Circuit;162 (8) Tax Court;163 and (9) the United States Court of
Federal Claims.164 UGSAs are administered through the CCC, an agency
that is charged with the responsibility, inter alia, to help maintain stable
prices for agricultural commodities. 165 As a result of CCC's price support
programs, it occasionally finds itself with large amounts of price-sup-
ported grain to store. This is exactly where the UGSA plays its most
important role; it facilitates the acquisition of storage facilities from
America's grain warehousemen to store the Government's price-sup-
ported grain.166
Courts and boards have been less than unanimous on how to define a
UGSA: they have called a UGSA a BOA, a Basic Agreement (BA),167
and a contract.1 68 This is understandable, because the UGSA is also like
156. PLB Grain Sotrage Corp. v. Blickman, 113 F.3d 1257 (table, text in Westlaw), un-
published disposition, 1997 WL 242179, 41 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 77,103 (Fed. Cir., May
12, 1997).
157. Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960).
158. Farmers elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Milam Co., 435 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1970).
159. United States v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 399 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1968).
160. Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1982).
161. United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973).
162. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 430 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1970).
163. Farmers Grain Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 298 (1995).
164. Alta Co-op. Elevator v. C.I.R., 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 453 (T.C. 1959).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1997), states that the CCC was created "[f]or the purpose of stabi-
lizing, supporting, and protecting farm income and prices, of assisting in the maintenance
of balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities, products thereof, feeds,
and fibers (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'agricultural commodities'), and of facili-
tating the orderly distribution of agricultural commodities ......
166. In Hicks Corner's Grain Elevator, Inc., the Board explained that "[t]he purpose of
the [UGSA] Agreement was to permit CCC to store CCC-owned grain in Appellant's
storage facility." Hicks Corner's Grain Elevator, Inc., 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,073 (Ag.
B.C.A. 1991).
167. Id. The dissenting opinion by Judge Edward Houry in Hicks Corner's Grain Ele-
vator called the UGSA a BOA and a BA. Judge Houry concluded that the UGSA is a
mere collection of terms, conditions, rates and charges which would be applicable only
when the Government stored grain in Appellant's warehouse and that the UGSA is in the
nature of a BA or BOA, not a contract over which the Board has jurisdiction.
A BOA under the provisions of the FAR is required to have certain provisions which
are not contained in the UGSA. Under 48 C.F.R. § 16.703, a BA is to contain clauses
required for negotiated contracts; the UGSA does not. Under 48 C.F.R. § 16.702(1), a BA
is to contain a provision for discontinuing its future applicability upon a 30-day notice; the
UGSA does not. If the UGSA is to be a BA, then the loading order is the "contract" that,
according to the FAR, should include a scope of work and price, delivery, and other appro-
priate terms that apply to the particular contract. 48 C.F.R. § 16.702(d). If the UGSA is a
BOA, it does not contain a provision indicating at what point in time it becomes a contract.
48 C.F.R. § 16.703(c). Thus, a CO, before issuing an order under a BOA, is to obtain
competition, assure that its use is not prejudicial to other offerors, or obtain other approv-
als or justifications as if the order were a contract independent of the BOA. 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.703(d)(1).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbertson, 588 F.2d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 1978), where the
Eighth Circuit held the UGSA to be a contract:
[Slummarized briefly, Hastings had entered into a contract, known as a uni-
form grain storage agreement, with the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC), an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture. The
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a chameleon: (1) there is the "bare UGSA," the actual instrument of
understanding or BOA standing alone without any purchase order to ac-
tivate it, and which the FAR states emphatically (to the extent that it is a
simple BOA) is not a contract; 169 (2) there is the UGSA combined with
an "Extended Grain Storage Agreement" (EGSA), which creates a duty
for the CCC to pay a certain sum of money to a farmer in exchange for
the farmer being ready, willing, and able to store a certain quantity of
grain;170 and (3) there is the UGSA where CCC has executed a service or
loading order informing the farmer that for a certain sum of money he
must be ready, willing, and able to store a certain amount of grain immi-
nently.171 The Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals has wrestled with
the primary UGSA issue-at what stage of life does the UGSA become a
contract and therefore become enforceable-at least nineteen times. 172
[UGSA] contract allows local elevators to store grain which has been
pledged by producers for price support loans. Because such grain could only
be stored at CCC-approved elevators, the Transportation-Warehouse Divi-
sion of the Department of Agriculture conducts examinations of warehouse
facilities under contract with the CCC in order to determine whether, accord-
ing to the grain storage agreement, the warehouse is suitable for storage and
that the warehouse's inventories as reflected in its records are actually on
hand.
See also Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1960), where
the Second Circuit stated that a UGSA was a contract: "[i]n the summer of 1949 Cargill
agreed that it would adapt these tanks for the storage of 5,000,000 bushels of corn. The
contract was the 1946 form of the Uniform Grain Storage Agreement." See also, United
States v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1420, 1428-29 (D. Kan. 1998), where the District
Court explained that an UGSA was a contract:
[tihe [CCC], an agency and instrumentality of the United States, 15 U.S.C.
§ 714, administers the major federal price support and agricultural commod-
ity programs, and as a consequence, obtains grain from producers. 7 U.S.C.
§ 1421 et. seq. Congress has given CCC authority to enter into contracts, or
Uniform Grain Storage Agreements ... with public warehouses to store this
grain. 15 U.S.C. § 714b(h).
169. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 states clearly in pertinent part that "[a] basic ordering agree-
ment is not a contract."
170. See, e.g., PLB Grain Storage Corp., 94-3 BCA (CCH) 27,186 (Ag. B.C.A. 1994),
where the Board explained an EGSA:
These appeals arose from Uniform Grain Storage Agreement (UGSA) No.
A48-3-CCC- 2783, dated May 1, 1980, and an Extended Grain Storage
Agreement (ESA) [sic] supplement to the UGSA dated February 12, 1982
(the contract). The agreements were entered into between the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) ... whose contracts are administered by the Agri-
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), U. S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and PLB Grain Storage Corporation (Appellant).
The UGSA/EGSA required appellant to make available a facility to store at least
13,541,594 bushels of CCC grain in exchange for CCC's payment of $10,020.78 per day
through December 31, 1986. Although the obligation of CCC to make such payments was
not conditioned upon the actual storage of grain, appellant was obligated to protect the
quantity and quality of any grain actually stored. Id.
171. See, e.g., Gibson in re Dissolution of Delta Prod. Co., 93-2 BCA (CCH) 25, 615
(Ag. B.C.A. 1992), where the Board explained that sometimes the exact point of offer and
acceptance is not crystal clear: "the UGSA does not set forth a specific ordering procedure
or specify the manner in which offers and acceptances to store grain are to be made. Ac-
cordingly, whether an offer was made will depend upon general contract principles."
172. See, e.g., Means Co., 95-2 BCA (CCH) $ 27,837 (Ag. B.C.A.1995) (finding a
UGSA was an express contract); Agripen Fermentation Corp., 95-1 BCA (CCH) 27,389
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As discussed later in this article, the BOA also goes through similar
phases of its life: (1) the bare BOA that is described by the FAR;173 (2)
the BOA which is subject to an order that is unpriced;174 (3) the BOA
that is priced;175 and (4) the BOA where there has been performance on
the part of the contractor in response to a purchase order or service
order.17
6
II. FROM REYNOLDS TO TRAUMA SERVICE GROUP AND
TOTAL MEDICAL MANAGEMENT
When ruling on 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, almost without exception, cited Reynolds v. Army & Air Force
Exchange Service177 as one of the leading Federal Circuit cases delineat-
ing the elements to be addressed on this motion. In fact, since it was
decided 1988, Reynolds has been cited approximately 212 times by the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit.' 78 Under Reynolds, plaintiffs suing the Government under
the Tucker Act 179 first had to survive the Government's 12(b)(1) Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction to be entitled to an actual hearing on
the merits of the case. Under Reynolds, plaintiffs had a difficult tripar-
tite-elements test to overcome: (1) to plead proper jurisdiction, e.g., by
(Ag. B.C.A. 1995) (finding that the board has jurisdiction to hear an appeal on an amount
of corn released by the Government by the CCC under a UGSA contract); In re PLB
Grain Storage Corp., 94-3 BCA (CCH) $ 27,186 (Ag. B.C.A. 1994) (finding that a USGA
neither required CCC to store grain nor Appellant to accept grain, since grain was stored
by mutual agreement); Howard W. McDaniel, 93-3 BCA (CCH) 26,211 (Ag. B.C.A.
1993) (finding that a USGA contract appeal is dismissed for exceeding 90-day statutory
appeal requirement).
173. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2002).
174. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 846 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
178. See, e.g., Moyer v. United States, 190 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Reyn-
olds for the proposition that fact finding is proper when jurisdictional facts are chal-
lenged); Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Reynolds at
747, the court correctly allowed parties to submit relevant evidence about jurisdiction);
Registration Control Sys., Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(citing Reynolds at 746, the court stated that when issues of underlying facts that establish
jurisdiction exist, relevant facts must be found by the trial court).
179. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, waives sovereign immunity from suit:
for all claims founded upon the Constitution, statutes, regulations, or any
contract, express or implied, with the U.S. Government. Originally passed in
1855 and enacted in its present form in 1887, the Tucker Act made the
[United States] Court of Claims the major court resolving Government con-
tract disputes, but gave federal district courts jurisdiction up to $10,000. The
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 repealed that part of the Tucker Act that gave
the federal district courts jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000 and gave con-
tractors direct access to the Court of Claims to challenge contracting officer
decisions on contract disputes. The Federal Courts Improvement Act further
altered the process by creating the Court of Federal Claims (originally
named the Claims Court) and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
out of the former Court of Claims [and the former United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals].
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 523-24 (internal citations omitted).
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pleading a well-pled contract; 180 (2) to prove proper jurisdiction; 181 and
(3) to fulfill its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 182
Moreover, when the Government's motion contained challenges to the
truth of the jurisdictional facts contained in the complaint, the trial court
was also able to consider relevant evidence outside of the pleadings in
order to resolve those factual disputes. 183 However, in the mid-1990s,
two decisions, Total Medical Management v. United States184 (TMM) and
Trauma Service Group v. United States185 (TSG) caused a split in the
United States Court of Federal Claims with respect to whether a contrac-
tor's well-pled contract allegation by itself was sufficient to overcome a
Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Mat-
ter Jurisdiction.1 86
The appeals of both TSG and TMM to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC), 187 allowed the CAFC to resolve this split in
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 188 On the same day, January 16, 1997,
the Federal Circuit issued both decisions. These two appellate decisions
180. Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 747.
181. Id. at 748.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 747.
184. 29 Fed. Cl. 296 (1993).
185. 33 Fed. Cl. 426 (1995).
186. Compare Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. 296 (Judge Turner holding that challenges
to jurisdiction are overcome on the basis of well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; the
Tucker Act simply requires that for jurisdiction to exist, plaintiff's claim must be founded
upon any express or implied contract with the United States), with Trauma Serv. Group, 33
Fed. Cl. 426 (Judge Weinstein, on the other hand, holding that even if memorandum of
agreement were a contract, it was not enforceable under the Tucker Act where it set out no
remedy for breach or nonperformance).
187. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is:
the appellate (reviewing) court for both the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
and the various Agency Boards of Contract Appeals. Because the Supreme
Court rarely considers decisions regarding Government contract disputes,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit typically provides the last op-
portunity for their review. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the Appellate
Division of the U.S. Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 150 (internal citations omitted).
188. The United States Court of Federal Claims:
was established especially to hear and decide legal claims against the Gov-
ernment. It is an Article I court with judges appointed for 15-year terms. Its
basic jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), but it has a variety of
additional jurisdictional statutes. Under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613, as amended, this court shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the Boards of Contract Appeals (BCAs) over Government contract dis-
putes (each contractor appealing a decision of the Contracting Officer must
elect either the agency BCA or the Court of Federal Claims). The otherjurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims most relevant to Government
procurement concerns protests, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), disputes concerning
fraud or forfeiture, 41 U.S.C. § 604, and Patent and Copyright disputes, 28
U.S.C. § 1498. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 created this
court (called the Claims Court until 1992) from the Trial Division of the
Court of Claims.
Nash et al., supra note 1, at 151.
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will no doubt have a substantial impact on all Executive Agencies' BOAs
because they will allow BOAs, from this point on, when simply accompa-
nied by a well-pled contract in a complaint, to overcome a Government's
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 189
thus eliminating once and for all the numerous hurdles Reynolds had
placed in front of contractors before they could actually have a trial on
the merits of their complaint before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
These two Federal Circuit decisions should also force the revision of rele-
vant BOA sections in the FAR and the DFARS, particularly where they
state unequivocally that "[a] basic ordering agreement [BOA] is not a
contract." 190 As we will see, subsequent decisions, in general, have held
that BOAs, accompanied by a complaint containing a well-pled contract,
will now successfully overcome a Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.
A. REYNOLDS' REJECTION OF AN APPELLANT'S WELL-PLED
CONTRACT DEFENSE TO A GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
The Reynolds case stands for the proposition that a well-pled contract
in a BOA complaint is never sufficient to overcome a government's
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 191 Reynolds requires
that in order for a plaintiff to have his day in court, he must first prevail at
the oral hearing devoted solely to the Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Mo-
tion to Dismiss. 92 Under Reynolds, appellant faces a tripartite-elements
test at the motions hearing: (1) to plead proper jurisdiction, such as by
pleading a well-pled contract;193 (2) to prove successfully the court's
proper jurisdiction; 94 and (3) to fulfill its burden of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.' 95 During the history of the application of
Reynolds' tripartite-elements test, the Federal Circuit has woven in addi-
tional guidelines for the trial judge. For example, when considering
whether to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
189. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Court of Federal Claims reads in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto of one if required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
R. CT. FED. CL. 12(b)(1). See Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1319 ("the law is clear that,
for the Court of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction, a valid contract must only be pleaded,
not ultimately proven") and Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1324 ("[a] well-pleaded alle-
gation in the complaint is sufficient to overcome challenges to jurisdiction").
190. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a). See also 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(c) where the FAR states "[a]
basic ordering agreement [BOA] shall not state or imply any agreement by the Govern-
ment to place future contracts or orders with the contractor or be used in any manner to
restrict competition."







pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the trial court must accept as true any undis-
puted allegation of fact made by plaintiffs;196 when disputed facts relevant
to the issue of jurisdiction exists, the trial court is required to decide those
facts;197 when the trial court is resolving the conflict between disputed
facts in the pleadings, the court may also take relevant evidence outside
of the pleadings, such as additional memoranda, exhibits, and affidavits,
in order to resolve the disputes necessary to make a decision on the mo-
tion,1 98 notwithstanding the fact that trial courts are normally strictly lim-
ited to the four corners of the pleadings when deciding such motions. 199
Trial courts also should not grant a motion to dismiss unless it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.200 On the other hand, con-
clusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not with-
stand a motion to dismiss.201
B. THE DISMANTLING OF REYNOLDS: THE 12(B)(1 JURISDICTIONAL
ACCEPTANCE OF A WELL-PLED CONTRACr ALONE
1. Trauma Service Group Before the Court of Federal Claims
Trauma Services Group, Ltd., a provider of health care services under a
CHAMPUS partnership agreement, sued the Federal Government in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims, to recover the salary it paid to an X-ray
technician who allegedly performed services pursuant to the CHAMPUS
agreement. 20 2 Under the rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the
Government had sixty days to file its answer that could contain, inter alia,
a Rule 12(b)(1), a Rule 12(b)(4), or a Rule 56 Motion.20 3 In its answer,
the Government filed "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alterna-
tive, for Summary Judgment. '20 4 The Government moved: (1) to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter under Rule 12(b)(1); (2) to
196. Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 746-47 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 747.
198. See Vink v. Hendrikus Johannes Schijf, Rolkan N.V., 839 F.2d 676, 677 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (finding trial court was correct when it considered additional memoranda, exhibits,
and affidavits prior to issuing an order of dismissal in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion proceeding);
See also Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
that, in deciding such a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court can consider, as it did in this
case, evidentiary matters outside the pleadings).
199. See Cupey Bajo Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 23 0l. Ct. 406, 411 (1991)
(holding that when facts relevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction are disputed,
the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve those disputed facts) (cit-
ing Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 747).
200. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
201. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981), affd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
202. Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 426 (1995).
203. See R. Cr. FED. CL. Rule 12(b) which states in pertinent part "Every defense, in
law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. .."
204. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,
at 1, Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd., 33 Fed. Cl. 426 (1995).
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dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
under Rule 12(b)(4); and (3) for summary judgment under Rule 56.205
The government framed the issue before the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims as "whether the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)" between
Trauma Services Group, Ltd. (TSG) and the Department of the Army
(Army) contains the requisite elements for a contract, given that it does
not state that it is binding and that it does not contain any remedies for
breach. ' 20 6 Because "the only agreements [upon] which TSG brings this
action are its MOUs with the Army" and since "MOUs are not binding,
enforceable contracts," the Government maintained that MOUs could
not provide the "binding express contract" 20 7 necessary to vest the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims with proper jurisdiction. 20 8 Moreover, the Gov-
ernment added that the "MOUs [were] not sufficiently complete or cer-
tain in their terms so that the promises and performances to be rendered
[could be] reasonably determined. '20 9 "When challenged by a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss," the Government maintained, "a plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the soundness of its allegations of
jurisdiction, '210
Plaintiff TSG, on the other hand, proffered the cardinal issue as
"whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that this Honorable Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim?" 211 Plaintiff argued, in-
ter alia, that MOUs were contracts and were "binding and enforceable"
citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that the Memorandum of
Understanding between plaintiff and defendant was a "promise or set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the perform-
ance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty. '212 For the au-
thorization to contract, plaintiff cited 10 U.S.C. § 1097 (Supp. 1993):
"[T]he Secretary of Defense ... may contract for the delivery of health
care to which covered beneficiaries are entitled... [and] may enter into a
contract.., with ... (1) Health maintenance organizations. (2) Preferred
provider organizations. (3) Individual providers .... [or] (4) Consortiums
205. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (No.
94-547C).
206. Id.
207. The Government points out in one of their footnotes that the elements for either
an express or an implied-in-fact contract are the same (citing Schuerman v. United States,
30 Fed. Cl. 420, 426 (1994)); Jsasi v. Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that the establishment of an implied-in-fact contract requires proof of the same elements as
for a showing of an express contract).
208. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9, Trauma Serv. Group. Ltd. (No. 94-547C).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 10. Am. Pac. Roofing Co. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 265, 267 (1990)
("where the court's jurisdiction is put in question, plaintiff 'bears the burden of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence"') (quoting Reynolds, 846
F.2d at 748).
211. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment, at 2, Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. (No. 94-547C) (emphasis added).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §1 (1979).
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of such providers .... ,,213 Moreover, according to plaintiff, "[t]he MOUs
are binding, enforceable contracts, signed by authorized Government
personnel to acquire services from a private contractor to be paid for with
legislatively appropriated funds. '214 The MOU was supported by "con-
sideration, inter alia, by Plaintiff, in the form of Plaintiff's performance
which was in exchange for Defendant's promises embodied in the MOU.
"215
In the Government's "Reply to Plaintiff's Response," the Government
averred that
TSG simply asserts that the MOUs are contracts and that such al-
leged contracts is [sic] covered by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
(CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. However, TSG's assertions simply
ignore the precise issue before this court: whether the MOUs are con-
tracts in the first instance. Accordingly, because TSG has not made
the requisite showing, defendant's motion to dismiss ... should be
granted.216
In its decision, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Judge Weinstein pre-
siding, reached four cardinal conclusions: (1) that this particular MOA
was not a binding contract; 217 (2) that this MOA was not authorized and
therefore unenforceable; 218 (3) that plaintiff's claim was tortious and not
contractual; 219 and (4) that this MOA under CHAMPUS was not prima-
rily for the "direct benefit or use" of the Government under the
CHAMPUS program. 220 The trial court's reasoning behind conclusions
one and four, I believe, was particularly weak, notwithstanding the fact
that the Federal Circuit affirmed the ultimate decision. The trial court 221
reached its first conclusion, that the MOA was not a contract, on the
grounds that this particular MOA did not set forth a breach remedy,
therefore it could not be a contract. In reaching this conclusion, it relied
solely on a 1994 U.S. Court of Federal Claims case, Aerolineas Argentinas
v. United States,222 also authored by Judge Weinstein. Judge Weinstein's
own cited opinion that was subsequently reversed, vacated, and re-
manded by the federal circuit,223 was the only case Judge Weinstein relied
213. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 9, Trauma Serv. Group,
Ltd. (No. 94-547C).
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71, 72 (1979)).
216. See Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at 1, Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. (No. 94-
547C) (emphasis added).
217. Trauma Serv. Group, 33 Fed. Cl. at 430.
218. Id. at 431.
219. Id. at 432
220. Id. at 429
221. The same United States Court of Federal Claims.
222. 31 Fed. Cl. 25, 35-36 & n.13 (1994).
223. Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564 (1996) (holding that the
Iucker Act provided jurisdiction to recover sums exacted illegally by Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service (INS) due to this misinterpretation of or misapplication of statutes,
regulations or forms; that, moreover, imposing on airlines the cost of long-term detention
of excludable aliens after assignment of that obligation to the INS with money in user fee
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upon to support her conclusion that the instant MOA was not a contract.
Aerolineas Argentinas224 unfortunately (1) had nothing to do with a
"BOA" a "MOA" or "CHAMPUS;" (2) never mentioned the terms
"BOA," "MOA", or "CHAMPUS" in its opinion; (3) dealt with an en-
forceable contract and the interpretation thereof; and (4) could in fact
just as easily have been found to be inapposite because the contract in
question (Form 1-426, The Immediate and Continuous Transit Agreement
with the INS) also did not provide a remedy for the financial harm that
was caused to the airlines involved.225
The trial judge, unfortunately, did not mention that the obvious lack of
remedy in this agreement, Form 1-426, for the financial harm suffered by
the airlines in her cited case, was any cause for concern whatsoever with
regard to the agreement's enforceability. For example, should the fact
that the Form 1-426 agreement lacked a remedy for a reasonably foresee-
able financial harm suffered by the airlines create a problem as to the
enforceability of this agreement? Perhaps the trial judge believed that
using the "cf"226 designation for its only cited case, 227 Aerolineas Argen-
tinas,228 resolved the serious problem of relevancy-at the very least, the
problem of extreme attenuation or nexus between the two opinions, or, at
the very worst, the substantial problem that the trial judge's cited case
was actually inapposite. The trial judge's only cited case, Aerolineas Ar-
gentinas, could actually have been construed as inapposite because it
could have stood for the proposition that an agreement could still be an
account was an illegal exaction of monies to meet obligation of the federal government;
and that the airlines were entitled to recovery of monies exacted).
224. Id.
225. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 31 Fed. Cl. at 25. Aerolineas Argentinas Airlines, com-
plying with the orders of U.S. immigration officials, detained six passengers and suffered
damages of $162,000, while Pakistan International Airlines suffered damages of $89.34.54
due to compliance with the same orders. Id. at 28-29.
226. According to the Bluebook, "cf." means "compare." It continues to explain that
the "cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition" and that
"[t]he citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained. Parenthet-
ical explanations, however brief, are therefore strongly recommended." (emphasis supplied).
THE BLUEBOOK, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, R. 1.2(a) at 23 (Columbia Law Re-
view Ass'n eds., 17th ed. 2000). The trial judge did not provide any parenthetical explana-
tion when she "cf-ed" Aerolineas, as the Bluebook strongly urges.
227. A fair question to ask the trial court was why it did not cite or at least distinguish
an earlier opinion from the same Court of Federal Claims that had issued just two years
previously that dealt directly with BOAs and a CHAMPUS MOU and even included the
same Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, i.e.,
Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1314. This would have been a very relevant cite, and one
that would not have needed the use of a "cf." If the trial court did not agree with the Court
of Federal Claim's earlier decision in TMM, which had almost identical issues, the trial
court at least had a duty to state that it was cognizant of the Court of Federal Claim's
earlier decision, and to provide reasons why it believed TMM was irrelevant or distinguish-
able. The TSG opinion did neither.
228. Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1564. The trial court's opinion was also collater-
ally attacked and suffered a reversal in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Reno, 80 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) lacked statutory authority to require airline carriers to
pay detention expenses of stowaways applying for asylum, since they were excludable, not
excluded, and statute justifying stowaway policy applied only to excluded aliens).
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
enforceable contract even though it did not provide a specific remedy for
a reasonably foreseeable problem. 229 A second shaky conclusion reached
by the trial judge was that "the MOA is not primarily for the 'direct bene-
fit or use' of the government. '230 Yet, the trial judge wrote a statement
earlier in her opinion that appears, at worst, to contradict the trial judge's
conclusion, or at best to make this particular conclusion a non sequitur.
In the same paragraph, the trial judge stated, "the principal purpose of
the MOA, as authorized by § 1096, is mutual assistance in carrying out the
purposes of the CHAMPUS program, facilitating the delivery of [medical]
care to third-party CHAMPUS beneficiaries, and reducing costs for both
parties.'' 231 Moreover, the plaintiff in TSG gave a detailed and persuasive
argument regarding the "beneficial use" of the CHAMPUS MOU to the
families of our military in its "Memorandum of Law." Plaintiff explained
"that both active and retired personnel, and their qualified dependents,
are entitled to medical care at military facilities pursuant to the Depen-
dents Medical Care Act of 1956," and that "[Pilaintiff, a Pennsylvania
corporation in the business of providing health care, contracted via an
MOU with defendant [and] Plaintiff agreed in said contract ... to provide
certain outpatient health care services at WACH in exchange for compen-
sation to plaintiff therefor . *"232
Notwithstanding the fact that health services were being provided to
the army by qualified medical doctors or physicians, as well as other med-
ical support professionals, and to the families of our enlisted military per-
sonnel, the trial judge still insisted that this MOU CHAMPUS agreement
was not for the benefit of the military service. The trial judge's opinion
completely ignored plaintiff's detailed explanation of the "beneficial use"
of plaintiff's CHAMPUS MOU agreement whereby it provided medical
doctors, nurses, etc., to serve the families of our military.233
However, notwithstanding the clear weaknesses in at least two of the
four cardinal conclusions as demonstrated above, the federal circuit still
affirmed the trial court's TSG opinion on other grounds. It is important
to note that while the trial judge's TSG opinion granted both the Govern-
ment's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion and its 12(b)(4) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon
229. The lower court stated in pertinent part:
[f]inally, the regulation excluding detention of TWOV passengers from the
ambit of 8 U.S.C. § 1356 also establishes that the law does not mandate the
payment of money to plaintiffs under these circumstances .... Plaintiffs do
not argue that any statute other than 8 U.S.C. § 1356 provides a basis for
jurisdiction. Because 8 U.S.C. § 1356 cannot fairly be interpreted as mandat-
ing compensation for a carrier's detention expenses, the court cannot base
jurisdiction over the airlines' claims on that statute.
Aerolineas Argentinas, 31 Fed. Cl. At 32 (internal citation omitted).
230. Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 426, 429 (1995).
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Trauma Serv. Group,
Ltd. (No. 94-547C) (emphasis added).
233. See Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd., 33 Fed. Cl. at 429.
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which relief can be granted, 234 the Federal Circuit only affirmed the trial
court's granting of the Government's 12(b)(4) motion.235 It correctly re-
versed the trial judge's granting of the Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Mo-
tion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.236 However, the
affirmance of just one of the two motions to dismiss granted by the trial
court, i.e., the affirmance of the trial judge's granting the government's
12(b)(4) motion, was sufficient to affirm this trial judge's opinion.237 Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Circuit's reversal of the trial judge's granting of the
Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Jurisdiction did not ulti-
mately hurt the Government.
The distinctions between the two motions, as well as the legal effects of
their different results, are significant. A dismissal under 12(b)(1) motion
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits,
but a "dismissal under 12(b)(4) motion for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted would bar a future suit by this plaintiff. '238
Therefore, when the trial court's granting of the government's rule
12(b)(4) motion was affirmed by the federal circuit, plaintiff was barred
forever from pursuing this particular suit!
2. Total Medical Management Before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
The appeal of TMM was actually decided by the same trial court, the
United States Court of Federal Claims just two years before the TSG
opinion, but by another trial judge.239 As discussed earlier, TMM raised
issues almost identical to those raised in TSG. In TMM, another private
health care provider sued the Government claiming it was paid lower
rates than allegedly bargained for in certain agreements to provide health
care services under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uni-
234. The Federal Circuit stated in pertinent part "[t]he Court of Federal Claims based
its decision to dismiss the complaint on both lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under
RCFC 12(b)(1), and on failure to state a claim, under RCFC 12(b)(4)." Trauma Serv.
Group, Ltd., 104 F.3d at 1324.
235. The Federal Circuit reiterated the three-prong attack the Government used, the
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss; the Rule 12(b)(4) Motion to Dismiss, and the Rule 56
Summary Judgment Motion, wherein the trial court granted both Motions to Dismiss. It
explained that "[t]o affirm the trial court, this court need only find sufficient justification
for one of these grounds." Id. (citing Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549,
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). It then stated "[b]ecause the trial court properly granted the Mo-
tion to Dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(4), this court affirms." Id. at 1323.
236. Id. This is clear from a reading of the Federal Circuit's opinion because the court
did not state, as it did for the lower court's granting of the 12(b)(4) Motion, that it affirmed
the granting of the 12(b)(1) Motion. Moreover, the federal circuit stated, "[a] well-pleaded
allegation in the complaint is sufficient to overcome challenges to jurisdiction." Id. at 1325
(citing Spruill v. Merit Sys. Protections Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). TSG's
complaint alleges that an express and in the alternative, an implied-in-fact contract under-
lies its claim. "This allegation suffices to confer subject matter jurisdiction in the Court of
Federal Claims." Id. at 1324 (emphasis added)
237. The Federal Circuit explained that "[t]o affirm the trial court, this court need only
find sufficient justification for one of these grounds [either the Rule 12(b)(1) motion or the
Rule 12(b)(4) motion]." Id.
238. Hedman v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 304, 306 (1988).
239. Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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formed Services (CHAMPUS).2 40 TMM brought suit against the United
States Department of the Army for alleged breaches of contract pursuant
to the CDA.2 41 TMM claimed damages based upon the Army's breach of
the parties' MOU between TMM and the Ireland Army Hospital, Fort
Knox, Kentucky, to provide internal medicine services at the hospital for
military health beneficiaries. Plaintiff explained that "[s]tatutorily speci-
fied military personnel, both active and retired, and their qualified depen-
dents, are entitled to medical care at military facilities pursuant to the
Dependents Medical Care Act ... " and that Plaintiff "contracted via an
MOU with Defendant [to] certain outpatient health care services at WACH
in exchange for compensation to Plaintiff therefor which Defendant
therein agreed to provide.
'242
The Government's Motion to Dismiss was brought solely under Rule
12(b)(1), 243 i.e., not accompanied by a 12(b)(4) motion or a summary
judgment motion as was the case in the appeal of TSG.244 The Govern-
ment maintained that notwithstanding the MOU between TMM and the
Ireland Army Hospital at Fort Knox, no contract existed and that conse-
quently the U.S. Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion.245 In its motion to dismiss, the Government used a two-prong
attack. First, it argued that because "no contracting officer's decision was
ever rendered or requested," the court determined it did not have proper
jurisdiction pursuant to the CDA. It relied on United States v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp.2 4 6 and Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States,247 both
standing for the proposition that there must first be a contracting officer's
decision or a request for such decision before an appeal to the court can
be taken.2 48 Second, while the Government admits that TMM submitted
its claim to Colonel Clements, the Commander of the Ireland Army
Community Hospital, the Government avers that Colonel Clements was
not a contracting officer 24 9 and therefore lacked the authority to bind the
240. Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. at 296-98.
241. Id.
242. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Trauma Serv. Group,
Ltd., (No. 94-547C) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
243. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. (No. 94-547C).
Footnote 1 of the defendant's motion reminded the court that it had a right to consider
evidentiary matters outside the four corners of the pleadings when necessary (citing In-
dium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
244. Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. at 298.
245. Id.
246. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing a line of cases interpreting submission of a
claim to the contracting officer, properly certified if necessary, and the rendering of a final
decision upon the claim, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action upon the claim before
the U. S. Court of Federal Claims).
247. 227 Ct. Cl. 176 (1981) (stating that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of this court
under the direct access section of the Contract Disputes Act-§ 609(a)(1)-there must first
be a "decision" or failure to decide by the contracting officer).
248. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1571-73.
249. A contracting officer (CO) is an employee of the Government with the authority
to bind the Government legally by signing a contractual instrument. 48 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)
(2002). Section 2.101 defines a contracting officer as a person with the authority to enter
into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings.
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Government to any contract. The Government concluded in its 12(b)(1)
motion that "TMM may have another avenue of relief in a different
court. .... -25o Notwithstanding the Government's kind suggestion, its
brief suggests that such relief in a different court was almost an impossi-
bility.251 Plaintiff, instead of filing a Response to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, filed a response to a Summary Judgment Motion that, not sur-
prisingly, did not address any arguments against granting the Rule
12(b)(1) Motion. Instead it focused on the existence of a dispute of rele-
vant material facts in an attempt to defeat the Government's Summary
Judgment Motion.2 52 On this Government's attack against jurisdiction
pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, unlike the trial judge in
TSG that faced the same issue, the TMM trial judge, Judge Turner, essen-
tially held that a well-pled contract alone could overcome a Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 253 Judge Tur-
ner held "[f]or purposes of deciding this motion, it does not matter
whether the existence of a contract in this case is a question of law, a
question of fact, or a hybrid. '2 54 "The important point is that questions
of law, like issues of fact, can only be decided after and not before the
Contracting officers are appointed in writing, on Standard Form 1402, Certificate of Ap-
pointment. 48 C.F.R. § 53.301-1402 (West 2002). In selecting contracting officers, the ap-
pointing official must consider the complexity and dollar value of the acquisitions to be
assigned and the candidates' training, education, business acumen, judgment, character,
and reputation. NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 127.
250. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 13, Total Med. Mgmt., (No. 92-838C).
251. In its Motion to Dismiss the Government propounds:
the limitations and strict construction of the CDA warrant that this Court
dismiss TMM's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Without
satisfying the strict prerequisites of a contracting officer's binding commit-
ment and a final decision in response to a properly certified claim, TMM
cannot look to this court for relief. Nor can TMM seek relief based upon the
equities of its assertions. As the Federal Circuit stated clearly in UNR Indus.
Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub nom,
Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 U.S. 373 (1992), "we cannot extend juris-
diction in the interest of equity."
Id. at 13-14. Moreover, pursuant to the Tucker Act and the CDA, the only federal court
with jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States founded upon any contract, ex-
press or implied, with the United States Government, is the United States Court of Federal
Claims. See supra note 12.
252. TMM titled its response "Plaintiff's Opposing Brief to Defendant's Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment" and accordingly devoted its entire efforts against being dismissed
on the merits in a summary judgment:
[t]he Government cannot prevail by showing that their interpretation of the
alleged ambiguity is somehow better than the contractor's interpretation,
rather, the crucial issue is whether the contractor's interpretation is within a
zone of reasonableness." Fry Communications, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 497 (1991). Under the doctrine of "Contra Proferentum," if any language
in a government-drafted agreement between the government and a private
party is ambiguous, that language may be construed against the government
if the private party's interpretation lies within a zone of reasonableness.
Temple v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 302 (1986).
See Plaintiff's Opposing Brief to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2,
Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. (No. 92-838C).
253. Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. at 298.
254. Id. at 298.
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court has assumed jurisdiction," maintained Judge Turner. 255 Conse-
quently, "Defendant's [the Government's] argument that no contract ex-
isted, thus challenges plaintiff's [TMM's] case on the merits, not the
court's jurisdiction. ' 256 Therefore, Judge Turner explicated, "[c]hallenges
to jurisdiction are overcome simply 'on the basis of well-pleaded allega-
tions in the complaint.' ' 257 Accordingly, Judge Turner continued,
"[j]urisdiction should not be confused with entitlement to relief which, of
course, does require proof of the contract or other substantive element in
question. ' 258 Finally, "for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the usual
presumption is that a contract exists if it is properly alleged."259 Judge
Turner concluded, "For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED. '260
Although TMM was ultimately reversed, the Federal Circuit did affirm
Judge Turner's ruling that a well-pled contract in a complaint filed with
the United States Court of Federal Claims is sufficient to overcome a
Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Mat-
ter Jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit explained in pertinent part:
Although the government argues that jurisdiction is lacking because
there was no enforceable contract, the law is clear that, for the Court
of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction, a valid contract must only be
pleaded, not ultimately proven .... There is no question that TMM
pleaded the existence of a valid contract here. The proper question,
despite the government's label, is one on the merits: whether TMM
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.261
3. Trauma Service Group before the Federal Circuit.
On the same day, January 16, 1997, the United States of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit issued its decisions on both the TSG and TMM ap-
peals. 262 In TSG, the Federal Circuit (Chief Judge Archer and Associate
Judges Michel and Rader) first held that a well-pleaded allegation in the
255. Id. (citing Ralston Steel Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 663, 667 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). The court explains further in footnote 1
of its opinion:
This principle is also discussed in Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679,
689 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that when [the] "outcome turns on a state of
facts that cannot be known until after the [tribunal] has ... decided them,"
the court should take jurisdiction and decide on the merits). See E. Trans-
Waste of Maryland, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 146, 149-50 (1992) (dis-
cussing the non-jurisdictional nature of disputes over the existence of privity
on contract); Metzger, Shadyac & Schwartz v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 107,
109 (1986) (Bruggink, J.) (discussing the non-jurisdictional nature of disputes
as to the existence of a contract).
Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. at 298.
256. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Spruill, 978 F. 2d at 686-88; E. Trans-Waste of Md., Inc., 27 Fed. Cl. at
149-50).
259. Total Med. Mgmt., 29 Fed. Cl. at 299 (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 302.
261. Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1319 (citations omitted).
262. Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1321; Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1314.
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plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to overcome a Government's Rule
12(b)(1) challenge to the jurisdiction of U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 263
The Federal Circuit explained:
[a] well-pleaded allegation in the complaint is sufficient to overcome
challenges to jurisdiction .... TSG's complaint alleges that an ex-
press and, in the alternative, an implied-in-fact contract underlies its
claim. This allegation suffices to confer subject matter jurisdiction in
the Court of Federal Claims .... Jurisdiction, therefore, is not de-
feated ... by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a
cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover .... 264
Secondly, the Federal Circuit stated that an agreement, such as an
MOA, can be a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act, conferring
jurisdiction on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims which hears and deter-
mines claims against the United States founded upon express or implied
contracts with the United States, thus also reversing Judge Weinstein on
this point of law.2 65 Judge Weinstein had concluded that the MOA under
CHAMPUS could not qualify as a government contract because it was
not for the "direct benefit or use" of the government because it provided
a medical service for the families of the military personnel, not the mili-
tary personnel themselves. The Federal Circuit reversed this finding of
Judge Weinstein, stating in pertinent part:
[a]ny agreement [including a MOA] can be a contract within the
meaning of the Tucker Act, provided that it meets the requirements
for a contract with the Government, specifically: mutual intent to
contract including an offer and acceptance, consideration, and a
Government representative who had actual authority to bind the
Government.... As such, contrary to the opinion of the trial court, a
MOA can also be a contract .... 266
The Federal Circuit added that the agreement must, of course, contain
a mutual intent to contract, including offer and acceptance, consideration,
and a government representative who had actual authority to bind the
government. 267 Accordingly, the MOA in question can be a contract
within the meaning of the Tucker Act. 268 However, notwithstanding the
fact that Plaintiff won these battles at the Federal Circuit, it still lost the
war, because it was unable to prove that it had an implied-in-fact contract
that the Tucker Act demands.269 As the Federal Circuit stated: "[tihe
Tucker Act supplies the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction for
claims against the United States founded upon the Constitution, an Act
of Congress, a regulation of an executive department, or an express or
263. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
264. Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 1326.
266. Id. at 1326 (citations omitted).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1324.
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implied contract. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). ' 270
4. Total Medical Management Before the Federal Circuit
In Total Medical Management v. United States, the same panel of judges
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as in TSG
(Chief Judge Archer and Associate Judges Michel and Rader), first found
that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act; that a valid contract need only be pled in the Complaint, not ulti-
mately proven; thus affirming Trial Judge Turner's denial of the Govern-
ment's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The appellate court reiterated:
[t]he Tucker Act limits the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims to any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an ex-
ecutive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994).271
Second, the Federal Circuit found that Plaintiff's MOU with the United
States to provide health care to dependents of members of the uniformed
services was indeed a procurement contract for the benefit of the govern-
ment, and, therefore, was subject to the CDA,2 72 again upholding Judge
Turner's finding. The Federal Circuit explained that "the existence of the
negotiated, signed MOUs evidences offer and acceptance," and that there
was also "consideration in the mutuality of obligation. '2 73 Mutuality of
obligation existed because "TMM is to provide discounted health care
services; the Army is to provide support staff and free space in the mili-
tary hospital. '2 74 Moreover, the Federal Circuit added, "[t]he MOUs
were forwarded to the Associated Group, the CHAMPUS approval des-
ignee, and were approved. Therefore, we hold that the MOU was ratified
by a government representative with the authority to bind the United
270. Id. "On this record, TSG would have to base any action against the United States
on a contract implied-in-law or on a tort theory. The Court of Federal Claims lacks juris-
diction to hear these suits." Id. at 1327 (emphasis added).
271. Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1319; see supra text accompanying note 256.
272. Id. at 1320 (MOUs are subject to the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 602(a),
because they are procurement contracts for the benefit of the government). It is "clear
that the government has legal obligations to military dependents and benefits by obtaining
said dependents' care at a reduced cost." Id. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) reads as follows:
Executive agency contracts. Unless otherwise specifically provided herein,
this Act applies to any express or implied contract (including those of the
nonappropriated fund activities described in sections 1346 and 1491 of title
28, United States Code) entered into by an executive agency for-
(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being;
(2) the procurement of services;
(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of
real property; or,
(4) the disposal of personal property.




States in contract. '2 75 It concluded, therefore, "we hold that all elements
for a contract were met by the MOUs. ''2 76
The Federal Circuit, however, also ruled that plaintiff's MOU contract
with the United States to provide health care to the dependents of the
members of the uniformed services was void as beyond the authority of
the Government's authorized agent because the MOU's payment sched-
ule conflicted with the payment schedule set forth in CHAMPUS. In ex-
plaining this dispositive conclusion, the Federal Circuit explained:
"[h]owever, even though the basic requirements for a government con-
tract are met, the contract is void because the MOUs are in direct conflict
with CHAMPUS regulations," and that "[n]either the Secretary of De-
fense nor any of his designated representatives had the authority to obli-
gate CHAMPUS beyond these base rates set by regulation. '277
Accordingly, while the Trial Judge was upheld on the majority of his
rulings, including his ruling that a well-pled contract in a complaint could
overcome a Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, Judge Turner was still reversed. Even though the MOU was
ratified by a government representative with authority to bind the United
States, that representative exceeded his authority by approving a wage
schedule that was in conflict with CHAMPUS. 278
However, most importantly, for the very first time, the Federal Circuit
held that a contractor could overcome a Government's Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction by simply as-
serting a well-pled contract in its complaint.2 79 Subsequently, at the ac-
tual trial on the merits, the contractor still has the burden of proving that
its BOA has indeed become an enforceable contract because it has all the
elements of a contract, i.e., an offer and acceptance by a Government
representative who had actual authority to bind the Government,2 80 or
ratified by a Government representative with authority to bind the
United States in a contract,28 1 and consideration of mutuality of
obligations. 282
In summary, we see that the Federal Circuit for the first time, in TSG
and TMM, has ruled that a private federal government contractor may
overcome a government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Mat-
ter Jurisdiction by simply filing a well-pled complaint asserting a contract
or a contract implied-in-fact as required by the Tucker Act.283
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1320-21.
278. Id.
279. Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d 1321; Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d 1314.
280. See infra text accompanying note 289.
281. See infra text accompanying note 290.
282. Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1320 (stating that we have "consideration in the
mutuality of obligation").
283. Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1325, Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1319.
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IV. FROM TRAUMA SERVICE GROUP AND TOTAL MEDICAL
MANAGEMENT TO NATIONAL MICROGRAPHICS AND
MCAFEE: UPHOLDING PLAINTIFF'S 12(B)(1) JURISDICTIONAL
RIGHT TO A TRIAL ON THE MERITS BASED SOLELY
UPON A WELL-PLED CONTRACT
A. NATIONAL MICROGRAPHICS AND MCAFEE
National Micrographics was the first case in the United States Court of
Federal Claims to apply the Federal Circuit's new holding2 84 that a well-
pled contract allegation in the complaint alone was sufficient to defeat a
Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Mat-
ter Jurisdiction.2 85 In National Micrographics Systems, Inc., a subcontrac-
tor of the prime contractor sued the United States in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims for the breach of an implied-in-fact contract 286 and for a
taking violation under the Fifth Amendment. 287 As part of its Answer,
the Government's attorney again filed, inter alia, a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and in the alternative,
a Rule 12(b)(4) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon
Which Relief can be Granted. 288 This article will specifically profile the
court's treatment of the Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, i.e., the lack of a CDA con-
tract.2 89 In response to the Government's Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), the National Micrographics Systems court (Judge Margolis pre-
siding) sagaciously explained, "[i]n evaluating a challenge to jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), this court must look no further than the allegations
contained in the complaint to determine whether plaintiff's claims fall
within the court's Tucker Act jurisdiction. '2 90 Judge Margolis held that it
284. See supra text accompanying notes 267, 273.
285. Nat'l Micrographics Sys. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 46 (1997).
286. An implied contract is a contract not created or evidenced by an explicit agree-
ment of the parties, but inferred, as a matter of reason and justice, from the parties' acts or
conduct, i.e., the circumstances surrounding the transaction making it reasonable or even
necessary to assume that a contract existed between the parties by tacit understanding.
Implied contracts are sometimes divided into two categories: (1) those implied-in-fact,
which derive from the above definition; and (2) those implied-in-law, often referred to as
"quasi-contracts." Quasi-contracts derive from obligations imposed on a person by the
law-not pursuant to the person's intention and agreement (either express or implied), and
even against the person's will and design-because circumstances between the parties are
such as to render it just that one party would have a right and the other party a correspond-
ing liability, similar to those that would arise from a contract between them. The United
States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over contracts implied-in-fact but not over
contracts implied-in-law. See JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ch. 2, § II (3d ed. 1998); Willard L. Boyd, Implied-in-Fact Con-
tract: Contractual Recovery Against the Government Without an Express Agreement, 21
PUB. CONT. L.J. 84 (1991). NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 289.
287. Nat'l Micrographics Sys., 38 Fed. Cl. at 47 (subcontractor of prime contractor sued
federal government for breach of implied-in-fact contract and for unconstitutional taking
after the government refused to pay for or return a computer system that the subcontractor
had delivered pursuant to its subcontract).
288. See supra note 18 discussing R. Ct. Fed. Cl. Rule 12(b).
289. See supra note 12 discussing the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978.
290. Nat'l Micrographics Sys., 38 Fed. Cl. at 49.
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was only necessary to find "a well-pleaded [contract] allegation in the
complaint" to overcome the Government's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss. 291
Another recent case to follow the Federal Circuit's rulings in TSG and
TMM is McAfee v. United States,292 where plaintiffs in the United States
Court of Federal Claims had asserted a well-pled contract. More specifi-
cally, the complaint alleged that one of the plaintiffs had contracted
orally with the United States, acting through the Department of Justice
and/or the Department of Agriculture, to provide services293 as an inter-
mediary in settlement negotiations between the United States and their
father, in exchange for the forgiveness of over $400,000 of Farm Services
Administration (FSA) loans secured by 405 acres of land in Fresno, Cali-
fornia.2 94 Plaintiffs' sole claim was that the government "breached an
express contract or... an implied-in-fact contract, to release federal liens
on their agricultural property. '2 95 Plaintiffs requested that the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims: "(1) prohibit the United States from proceeding
with its intended foreclosure; (2) specifically enforce the contract, or in
the alternative, award damages equal to the amount of the loan; and (3)
declare that the contract is valid, binding, and enforceable against the
United States. '296
The Government, once again, filed, inter alia, a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 297 In its opinion, the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims clearly articulated and applied the holding
of the Federal Circuit in TMM and TSG that a well-pled contract in a
complaint will defeat a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, explaining that "the Fed-
eral Circuit has held that a well pleaded allegation of an express, or im-
plied-in-fact, contract in a complaint 'is sufficient to overcome challenges
to jurisdiction' in the United States Court of Federal Claims. '2 98 The
trial judge explained that "plaintiff's complaint, when viewed in a light
most favorable to plaintiffs, alleges the existence of the requisite elements
291. Id. (citing Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
292. 46 Fed. Cl. 428 (2000).
293. Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 41
U.S.C. § 602(a) which states, inter alia, that the CDA covers contracts entered into by an
executive agency for the procurement of "services").
294. More specifically, Plaintiffs alleged:
(1) that the United States enlisted Mark McAfee's assistance as an interme-
diary in settlement negotiations in United States v. Rodger McAfee; (2) in
exchange for Mark McAfee's services, the United States agreed to forgive
FSA loans held on plaintiffs' property; (3) Mark McAfee performed accord-
ing to the agreement; (4) Daniel Bensing, AUSA, with Charles Stevens' ap-
proval or ratification was authorized to contract in this manner with Mark
McAfee; and (5) that the government breached the contract when Mary
Grady, Civil Chief, canceled and/or repudiated the contract and when the
FSA initiated foreclosure proceeding on plaintiffs' property.
McAfee, 46 Fed. Cl. at 431-32.
295. Id. at 431.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 432 (quoting Trauma Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d at 1325).
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for either an express contract or, alternatively, for an implied-in-fact con-
tract. '2 99 The trial judge continued: "[i]t is well established that, for this
court to have jurisdiction, a valid contract need only be pleaded, not
proven.
300
B. THE EFFECT OF TSG AND TMM ON THE
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
1. The Negative Ramifications of the Government Maintaining that
BOAs are Not Contracts: TINA Does Not Apply
In 1962, The Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA)30 1 established a con-
tractual domain to protect the Government in non-competitive proposals
or negotiations.302 TINA, for the very first time, established disclosure
and certification duties for private contractors who were parties to non-
competitive proposals.303 Pursuant to the TINA statute, the Government
also gained the right to reduce the price of a contract if it could demon-
strate that the negotiations between the parties increased the contract
price because the contractor's disclosed cost or pricing data, 304 contrary
299. McAfee, 46 Fed. Cl. at 432.
300. Id. at 432 (citing Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1319) (emphasis added).
301. Pub. Law No. 87-653, 76 Stat. 528 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.S. § 2306a
(1998 & Supp. 2002); 41 U.S.C. § 254b (Supp. 2002).
302. CONTRACT ATT-ORNEY'S COURSE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,
U.S. ARMY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW, 91 (1999) defines negotiated contracts to be
negotiated procurements formerly known as open market purchases. It further explains
such procurements were authorized only in emergencies and gives a brief history of their
development. In THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK, the term "negotia-
tion" is defined as a
method of contracting that uses either competitive or other-than-competitive
procedures that permits bargaining with the offerors after receipt of propos-
als. Any contract awarded without the use of sealed bidding procedures is a
negotiated contract .... [Negotiation] is now an equally acceptable method
of contracting as long as full and open competition is achieved, in which case
it is called the competitive proposals method of contracting.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 363.
303. TINA not only requires that all cost or pricing data significant to price negotiations
at the time of "agreement on price" be submitted by contractors, but it also requires that
the contractor "certify that to the best of [its] knowledge and belief," the data submitted to
the Government "are accurate, complete, and current." 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(a)(2), (g). The
FAR requires that the contractor does so in a prescribed "Certificate of Current Cost or
Pricing Data." 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-4(b) (2002). Cost or pricing data must be submitted on
standard form 1411, "Contracting Pricing Proposal Cover Sheet," along with supporting
attachments. Id. The requirements are explained in FAR 15.403-4. 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-3
(2002). TINA defines "cost or pricing data" as follows:
[T]he term "cost or pricing data" means all facts that, as of the date of agree-
ment on the price of a contract ... a prudent buyer or seller would reasona-
bly expect to affect price negotiations significantly. Such term does not
include information that is judgmental, but does include the factual informa-
tion from which a judgment was derived.
10 U.S.C. § 2306a(g). "The definition therefore includes three elements: (1) all facts, but
not judgments; (2) existing at the date of agreement on price; and (3) that are significant to
price negotiations." DONALD P. ARNAVAS & WILLIAM J. RUBERRY, GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACT GUIDEBOOK §§ 5-31, 32, 34, 35 (2d ed. 1994).
304. Examples of cost or pricing data are: (1) vendor quotations; (2) nonrecurring costs;
(3) information on changes in production methods and in production or purchasing vol-
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to its certificate, 30 5 were inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent.30 6 Ac-
cordingly, the Government could claim, pursuant to the CDA,307 that the
contractor's price was inflated and should be adjusted downward as al-
lowed in TINA pursuant to the "Price Reduction for Defective Cost or
Pricing Data" clause. 30 8 The combination of special statutes and clauses
meant that the negotiated 309 price could be reduced if the Government
met its TINA burden of proof before the Boards of Contract Appeals310
or the United States Court of Federal Claims. A reasonable corollary of
ume; (4) data supporting projections of business prospects and objectives and related oper-
ations costs; (5) make-or-buy decisions; (6) estimated resources to obtain business goals;
and (7) information on management decisions that could have a significant bearing on
costs. 48 C.F.R. § 15.801 (2002).
305. When required, certified cost or pricing data are comprised of two elements.
These are "(1) cost or pricing data, [and] (2) [a] Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data
certifying that to the best of [the contractor's] knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing
data were accurate, complete, and current as of the date of final agreement on price. 48
C.F.R. § 15.403-4(b) (2002).
306. [TINA] also provided for contract price adjustment as a result of submission
of defective cost or pricing data. In 1984 the Competition in Contracting
Act added these requirements to the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949 at 41 U.S.C. § 254b. Subsequently, in 1986, TINA was
greatly expanded and codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2306a.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 523.
307. Contractors are permitted to submit demands for a sum of money, or claims,
against the Government under the Contracts Disputes act of 1978. 41 U.S.C. § 603 (2002).
The Government may also assert claims against contractors (under TINA, for example).
See 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(f). Although before 1995 these claims could not be adjudicated (by
a Board Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims) unless there was a dispute
preceding the submission of the claim, the court in Reflective, Inc. v. Dalton held that no
such dispute was required "except where [the claim is for non-payment of] a 'voucher,
invoice, or other routine request for payment."' Reflective, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572,
1755 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 15.801).
In normal circumstances, disputes are resolved through negotiation or by the
use of Alternative Dispute Resolution procedures of FAR 33.204. If this is
not possible, the dispute must become the subject of a decision of the Con-
tracting Officer with further resolution subject to the CDA. FAR Subpart
33.2 provides guidance to contracting officers on the handling of disputes.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 197.
308. The "Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data" contract clause
implementing TINA states that if "any price, including profit or fee ... was
increased by any significant amount" because the contractor or subcontrac-
tor submitted data "that were not complete, accurate, and current as certi-
fied," [at the date of agreement on price,] the contract's "price or cost shall
be reduced accordingly.
CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOCK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW: THE DESKBOOK
FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS 145-46 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.215-10
(2002)).
309. See supra note 296.
310. The Government's TINA burden of proof has been explicated as follows:
[t]o prevail in a defective cost or pricing data case, the Government must
establish three elements by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the Gov-
ernment must establish that the disputed information is 'cost or pricing data'
within the meaning of the Truth in Negotiations Act. Second, the Govern-
ment must establish that the data was either not provided or was not pro-
vided in a usable, understandable format to a proper Government
representative. Third, the Government must show detrimental reliance on
the defective data and show by some reasonable method the amounts by
which the final negotiated price was overstated.
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this agreement is that the price was valid for billing purposes until the
Government proved its right to a price adjustment. The TINA statute31
is clear on its face, however, that it applies to negotiated contracts, 312 and
only to negotiated contracts. 313 Accordingly, a condition precedent for
the application of TINA is that a contract actually exists between the Fed-
eral Government and a private contractor to provide goods and services,
typically as provided by the CDA.3 14
For the following reasons, however, I believe the Federal Government
is being unreasonably shortsighted when it insists that BOAs are not con-
tracts. 31 5 TINA requires that certain classes of government contractors
provide "cost or pricing data," 316 so that the Government can assure itself
Appeal of Litton Sys., Inc., 92-2 BCA (CCH) J 24,842 at 123,944 (A.S. B.C.A. 1992); Syl-
vania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. United States, 479 F.2d 1342 (1973); The Boeing Co., 92-1 BCA
(CCH) T 24,414 (A.S. B.C.A. 1991); The Boeing Co., 90-1 BCA (CCH) 22,270 at 111,879
(A.S. B.C.A. 1989).
Section 8(d) of the CDA (41 U.S.C. § 607(d)) gives the Boards of Contract Appeals
authority to grant the same relief available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the
United States Court of Federal Claims. ROBERT T. PEACOCK & PETER D. TING, CON-
TRACT DisPuTEs ACT ANNOTATED 2-21 (1998).
311. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a.
312. "TINA requires that during negotiations for certain contracts and contract modifi-
cations, a contractor must provide the government with 'cost or pricing data,' a category of
information broadly defined as including 'all facts that . . . prudent buyers and sellers
would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly." 2/20/97 ANDREWS
GOV'T CONT. LITiG. REP. 3, p 1 (emphasis supplied). See also, Appeal of Univ. of Cal.,
San Francisco, 97-1 BCA (CCH) T 28,642 (V.A. B.C.A. 1996) (using the Christian Doc-
trine to include TINA in a government contract). Moreover, The Government Contracts
Reference Book assumes that a "contract" first exists for TINA to apply when it states that
the Christian Doctrine is "[a] legal rule providing that clauses required by regulation to be
included in Government contracts will be read into a contract whether or not physically
included in the contract... " (emphasis added). NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 91. Simi-
larly, to receive monetary relief under the CDA, there also must be a contract. Any claim
asserted under the Act "must identify the contract" under which the dispute arose. PEA-
COCK & TING, supra note 304, at 1-10.
313. TINA now applies to any "negotiated contract expected to exceed $550,000." a
modification of a negotiated contract expected to exceed $550,000, a modification of a
negotiated or sealed bid contract involving a price adjustment exceeding $550,000 if the
prime contractor and each higher-tier subcontractor are required to submit cost or pricing
data, or the modification of a subcontract involving a price adjustment exceeding $550,000.
To account for inflation, the dollar threshold levels for TINA may be adjusted every five
years. ARNAVAS & RUBERRY, supra note 297, at 5-28.
314. Section 3(a) of the CDA provides as follows: [t]his Act applies to any express or
implied contract (including those of the nonappropriated fund activities described in sec-
tions 1346 and 1491 of title 28, United States Code) entered into be an executive agency for
(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being;
(2) the procurement of services;
(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of
real property; or
(4) the disposal of personal property.
41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2002).
315. See generally, CImNIC & NASH, supra note 280, at ch. 1, § VII; Clarence T. Kipps
& John L. Rice, Living with TINA: A Practical Guide to the Truth in Negotiations Act,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (1989); Steven W. Feldman, The Truth in Negotiations Act: A Pri-
mer, 21 NAT'L CONT. MGMT. J., No. 2, at p. 67 (1988); NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 64.
316. See supra text accompanying note 309.
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that it is paying a reasonable price for the goods or services it receives. 317
For TINA to be applicable, however, there must be a "negotiated con-
tract" between the Federal Government and the private contractor. 318
Once we acknowledge that the sine qua non for TINA to apply is indeed
the existence of a negotiated contract, 319 it becomes imperative for the
Federal Government that the BOA in question, or other similar agree-
ment, be initially deemed a contract so that TINA may apply. Moreover,
it is important for the Federal Government that a BOA is deemed a nego-
tiated contract in order to enable the Government to enforce the
promises made by the supply or service contractor, e.g., to be ready to
perform at all times. At any time before the actual procurement order or
service order, the contractor must be ready to furnish the specific supplies
or services whenever the Government desires them.320 If, for some unex-
pected reason, the contractor is not ready to provide the supplies or ser-
vices it promised, the Government would lack the right to enforce the
terms of the BOA, if a BOA were not a contract.
It would also be important for the Federal Government that a BOA be
deemed a contract because it would allow the Government to "Chris-
tian" 321 in a TINA clause to a BOA, if a TINA clause had been acciden-
tally left out. For example, in the Appeal of University of California, San
Francisco,322 the Government had forgotten to include the "Price Reduc-
tion for Defective Cost or Pricing Data Clause" in the Government's ser-
vice contract, and the Board of Contract Appeals "Christianed" such a
clause into the Federal Government's contract, finding that the TINA
statute in general "[evidenced] a significant and deeply ingrained strand
of public procurement policy sufficient to require incorporation of the
317. This statutory requirement dates to the early 1960s from the congressional reaction
to the overcharging scandals of the 1950s relating to the sudden explosion of cost-based
purchasing, particularly with respect to the new aerospace contracts. TINA created a
sharp break from the normal realities of private commercial contracting law where it was
customary and legal to keep its costs to itself. Accordingly, "overcharging" in the sense of
charging more than a reasonable profit was not a violation of the law. TIEFER & SHOOK,
supra note 302, at 140-41.
318. ARNAVAS AND RUBERRY, supra note 297, at 5-28.
319. Supra note 296 (defining the term "negotiation").
320. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.703 (2002), entitled "Basic Ordering Agreement," which states
that the BOA shall describe "the supplies or services" that the contractor must be ready, at
all times, to supply the Government whenever the Government needs those supplies or
services.
321. "[This] doctrine derives from the case of G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States
.... [The court] held that the termination for convenience clause applied even though it
had been omitted from the contract, since the procurement regulations required its inclu-
sion." NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 91. Thus the Christian Doctrine became the legal rule
which provides that clauses required by regulation to be included in Government contracts
will be read into a contract whether or not physically included in the contract, unless a
proper deviation from the regulations has been obtained. Other commentaries insist "[the]
Christian doctrine should not, however, be read to mean that all procurement regulations
have the force and effect of law; it applies only to those regulations that implement funda-
mental procurement policy." Id. at 91-92; see, e.g., John B. Wyatt, III, The Christian Doc-
trine; Born Again but Sinfully Confusing, 33 CONT. MGMT., Nov. 1993, at 22.
322. 97-1 BCA (CCH) $ 28,642 (V.A. B.C.A. 1996).
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[Defective Cost or Pricing Clause after the fact] ... as a matter of law."'323
If there had been no contract in existence, i.e., only a bare BOA, and the
Government had forgotten to include the "Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data," I believe this clause could not be "Christianed" in
because the condition precedent to be able to add a clause under the
Christian doctrine is that there first be a "contract" in existence.324
Sometimes, however, whether a contract or a BOA exists is a very fine
line, and courts and boards have struggled with this distinction. For ex-
ample, in Appeal of Russell L. Kisling, the Board commented on how
close the distinction could be, stating "there is evidence the document
was either a basic ordering agreement or a contract. '325 In Appeal of
Hick's Corner's Grain Elevators, Inc., the Board of Contract Appeals
split two-to-one holding that the BOA in question was a contract. 326
Consistent with the BOA-contractual theory advanced in this article, I
voted with the majority in Hick's Corner's Grain Elevators, holding that
323. Id. at 143,069 (quoting S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1072
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). The Board also noted that the:
Christian doctrine was recently considered in two Federal Circuit cases. In
General Engineering & Machine Works v. O'Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 779 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), the court reaffirmed that "the Christian doctrine applies to
mandatory contract clauses which express a significant or deeply ingrained
strand of public procurement policy." It affirmed a decision incorporating a
requirement for separate cost pools into a contract. The regulation requiring
separate cost pools was determined to be "sufficiently ingrained" in public
procurement policy because it deterred double payments and "thus discour-
aged the unnecessary and wasteful spending of government money." Id. at
780.
In SI. Amoroso Construction Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir.1993), the
Court affirmed the incorporation into a contract of Buy American Act re-
quirements which the parties had stricken. Initially observing that
"[a]pplication of the CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE turns not on whether the clause
was intentionally or inadvertently omitted," the court emphasized that that
Buy American Act itself required that "[e]very contract for construction...
shall contain a provision" with respect to materials, supplies and articles
manufactured in the United States. Thus: "The statute alone, therefor...
[requires] incorporation of the clause prescribed ... as a matter of law." Id.
at 1076.
Appeal of Univ. of Cal., San Francisco, 97-1 BCA (CCH) at 143,067-69.
324. The Government Contract Reference Book's definition of the Christian Doctrine
assumes that there must first be a government contract where it states the Christian Doc-
trine is "[a] legal rule providing that clauses required by regulation to be included in Gov-
ernment contracts will be read into a contract whether or not physically included in the
contract ...." NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 91.
325. 88-2 BCA (CCH) 20,825 (Ag. B.C.A. 1988). The board also found they did not
need to decide which provision controlled, because the result would not change; if it was a
firm fixed price, definite quantity contract, no evidence supporting any damages was
found. Id. Even if the Government was found to have prevented the contractor's contin-
ued performance, then recovery would be limited to that available under the Termination
for Convenience clause. Id.
326. "[T]hat the UGSA [Uniform Grain Storage Agreement] is a mere collection of
terms, conditions, rates and charges which would be applicable if and when the Govern-
ment stored grain in Appellant's warehouse and that the UGSA is in the nature of a basic
agreement (BA) or basic ordering agreement (BOA), [but] not a contract over which the




the BOA in question was indeed a valid and therefore enforceable
contract.
327
In most instances, however, by virtue of the legion of its Rule 12(b)(1)
Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, the govern-
ment has still consistently maintained that BOAs are not contracts, even
where the contractor has already begun to perform its promises pursuant
to a purchase order or service order.328 While this non-contractual asser-
tion might help the Government prevent the contractor from prevailing
on its monetary claims in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or before a
Board of Contract Appeals, I believe it will, unfortunately, severely un-
dercut the Federal Government's averment that TINA is applicable to
BOAs or that a TINA clause can be "Christianed" into a BOA if the
Federal Government omits an important TINA clause.
2. Even Assuming Arguendo that BOAs are Contracts, Unpriced BOAs
Probably are Not Covered by TINA
Equally as important, in TINA's definition of "cost and pricing data,"
the "contractor must [also] disclose as 'facts' the data forming the basis
for any judgment, projection, or estimate that is made. '329 If the contrac-
tor fails to comply with the disclosure of this data, his "cost or pricing
data" will be deemed "incomplete or inaccurate. ' 330 And more impor-
tantly, the contractor is also responsible for disclosing all of the relevant
facts that form the basis of his price estimate at the "date of price agree-
ment," (i.e., the "handshake" date of the price agreement) even though
no legal contract may exist at that time.331 The question then arises as to
when this duty to proffer "cost and pricing" data with BOAs that initially
have no price agreement, such as in "unpriced" BOAs, begins, if it arises
at all.332 An unpriced BOA may be created where a contractor has prom-
ised to provide supplies or services to the Government in response to an
327. See also Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d 1321, where the court found "[b]ecause
[plaintiff] cannot show the existence of an express or an implied-in-fact contract, and the
breach thereof, the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed for failure to state a claim
under RCFC 12(b)(4)." Id. at 1328. In Total Medical Management, the court found, "since
the contracts were plainly illegal, they were void ab initio. A dismissal on this basis is one
for failure to state a claim. Since the MOUs were void ab initio, [plaintiff] failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." 104 F.3d at 1321.
328. See Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d 1321; Total Med. Mgmt., 104 F.3d at 1314.
329. ARNAVAS & RUBERRY, supra note 297, at 5-31.
330. Id. at 5-31. Under the above definition of cost or pricing data, the contractor must
disclose as "facts" the data forming the basis for any judgment, projection, or estimate that
is made. Id.
331. Id. (the "date of price agreement" means the "handshake" date of price agreement
between the parties, even though no legal contract may actually exist at that time).
332. An unpriced purchase order is an order for supplies or services where the price has
not been established at the time the order is issued. 48 C.F.R. § 13.302-2 (2002).
An unpriced purchase order may be used only when (1) the transaction is not
expected to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold; (2) it is impractical
to obtain pricing before issuing the purchase order; and (3) the purchase is
for repairs to equipment requiring disassembly to determine the nature and
extent of repairs, or for material that is available from only one source and
for which the cost cannot be readily established, or for supplies or services
2002]
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unpriced purchase order. At least fifteen appeals have been before the
Boards of Contract Appeals concerning defective pricing with "unpriced
BOAs. ' '333 The Boards generally agreed that where there is no binding
agreement on price, TINA will not apply and the Government will not
have a right to a price reduction for defective cost or pricing data.
Consider the following examples. In Ocean Technology, the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals faced a situation where the parties
could not agree upon an ultimate price because of the subsequent sub-
stantial change in price of one of its parts. The Board stated:
[t]he parties orally agreed to a negotiated settlement of $268,000 on
14 May 1976 .... Prior to the finalization of the negotiated agree-
ment, appellant advised that it could not furnish a Certificate of Cur-
rent Cost or Pricing Data because it had discovered a substantial
change in the price quoted on one item of material. 334
The Government unreasonably argued that notwithstanding the lack of
agreement on price, TINA still applied and that the Federal Government
therefore had a right to a price reduction based on a charge of defective
data.335 To the Federal Government's surprise and perhaps chagrin, the
Board of Contract Appeals correctly held that TINA does not apply
where there is "no agreement on a binding price. '336
In the Appeal of Boeing,337 the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals held that the "required pricing certification [of TINA] is not appli-
cable to ceiling prices submitted for unpriced purchase orders but rather
to the definitized pricing subsequently entered into by the parties. 338
for which prices are known to be competitive but exact prices are not known
(for example, miscellaneous repair parts or maintenance services).
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 533.
333. See, e.g., Appeal of Honeywell Federal Sys., Inc., 92-2 BCA (CCH) 24,966
(A.S.B.C.A. 1992) (holding that the Government is bound by the contracting officer's price
decision under a BOA, whether the officer exceeds his responsibility or not); Appeal of
Ford Aerospace Corp., 91-2 BCA (CCH) 23,911 (A.S. B.C.A. 1991) (holding that a BOA
estimated price is not a binding ceiling; parties can negotiate a fixed price); Appeal of
Times Fiber Communications, Inc., 91-2 BCA (CCH) T 24,013 (A.S. B.C.A. 1991) (holding
that costs based on an asset stepped-up value are allowed under a government contract (a
BOA)); Appeal of Beech Aircraft Corp., 83-1 BCA (CCH) 16,532 (A.S. B.C.A. 1983)
(holding that the Government was not bound by the cost quote of the contractor under a
BOA, but the contractor was entitled to a fair and reasonable value of the work he
performed).
334. In Appeal of Ocean Tech., Inc., 78-1 BCA (CCH) 13,204 (A.S. B.C.A 1978), the
Board stated:
[i]n our view the issue is the pricing of a contract modification pursuant to
the Changes clause. It is not a defective cost issue because there was no
agreement on a binding price that could have been decreased on account of
defective data. Thus as we said in Dewey Electronics Corp .... the question
is not the government's right to a price reduction for defective cost or pricing
data, but what is a fair and reasonable price for the spare parts order.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 76-1 B.C.A (CCH) 11,742 (A.S. B.C.A. 1976) (emphasis added).
338. Id. (emphasis added). The ceiling price, as clearly reflected in the record, was
furnished by the appellant and accepted by the Government, and was not intended by
either party to be the price of the unpriced order. Rather it was intended to simply fix an
agreed limitation on the Government's liability for future reference. The court found that
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This again substantiates my postulate that unpriced BOAs are not subject
to TINA because unpriced BOAs by definition have no agreement on a
binding price, the condition precedent for TINA to apply.
Moreover, in Appeal of Sanders Associates, Inc. 339 the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals again confirmed that there are indeed in-
stances where, because of the inability to predict future prices, a Certifi-
cate of Current Cost or Pricing Data would not be required. The Board
of Contract Appeals explained:
contrary to the Government's contention, this appeal does not in-
volve a question of defective cost or pricing data. As is the case in a
number of somewhat analogous situations, the "Certificate of Cur-
rent Cost or Pricing Data" . . . was never executed by Sanders be-
cause no agreement was ever reached on the price of the
modifications. 340
Finally, in the Appeal of Standard Manufacturing Co.,341 the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals clearly recognized that an unpriced
BOA standing alone did not cause a duty to arise at that moment in time
to provide the Federal Government with cost and pricing data when it
stated "[a]fter the issuance of an unpriced order the parties were to nego-
tiate price and delivery schedule, commencing with a proposal by the
contractor, which was to include, inter alia, a cost and price analysis as
prescribed.., and an executed certificate of current cost and pricing data
."342 Therefore, it was not until the procurement process had passed
the unpriced BOA stage into the actual price and delivery schedule stage
(and we assume a "handshake on the price agreement"), that the duty
then arose on the part of the contractor to furnish the applicable cost and
pricing data.343
both parties plainly expected to negotiate and price the unpriced order at some amount
below the agreed ceiling price. The court further found that since the ceiling price, as
agreed to, was not intended to be the price of the unpriced purchase order, the require-
ment of price certification requirement in subparagraph (2) of 10 USC, § 2306(f) did not
apply. Id.
339. 79-2 BCA (CCH) 14,159 (A.S. B.C.A. 1971).
340. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Board explicated:
First, we must observe that, contrary to the Government's contention, this
appeal does not involve a question of defective cost or pricing data. As was
the case in a number of somewhat analogous situations, the "Certificate Of
Current Cost Or Pricing Data" required by ASPR 3-807.6(a) was never exe-
cuted by Sanders because no agreement was ever reached on the price of the
modifications. Thus, our task is not to determine ". . . the government's right
to a price reduction for defective cost or pricing data, but what is a fair and
reasonable price for the spare parts order."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
341. 72-1 BCA (CCH) 9,371 (A.S. B.C.A. 1972).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 43,501, where the Board stated:
[t]he Government could also place 'unpriced' orders prior to agreement
upon the price and delivery schedule. The unpriced order bound the Gov-
ernment to pay up to a maximum price stated in the order. It bound the
contractor to proceed forthwith with the work, provided it had the capacity
and facilities to do so, or to promptly notify the precuring contracting officer
(PCO) of any reason it could not meet the desired delivery schedule. After
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Finally, in the Appeal of Ford Aerospace Corp.,344 the Board of Con-
tract Appeals commented on its frustration with the internal contradic-
tions found in a BOA, stating "[a]n unpriced bilateral order appears to be
a contradiction in terms under the BOA's ordering scheme . . . . ,,345 This
confirms my postulate that BOAs are oxymorons and indeed a "Catch-22
Chameleon" for all government contractors.
3. Assuming Arguendo that BOAs Are Contracts, Priced BOAs Are
Covered by TINA
Finally, there have been at least six appeals346 before the Boards of
Contract Appeals concerning "priced BOAs" and TINA where the Gov-
ernment, pursuant to its right under the "Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data Clause," 347 required the production of certified cost
or pricing data. There is no question that the TINA requires that produc-
tion of cost or pricing data "before the award of a contract," 348 and the
following cases illustrate the Government requesting the cost or pricing
data in a timely manner pursuant to TINA, and (1) where the "price or
cost data" were properly requested by the Government at the time of
"price agreement." and (2) where the Government properly requested
the "price or cost data" at the time of the "price agreement," but where
the Government contractor successfully asserted the "commercial item
exemption" 349 in TINA. Note, however, that in all the following exam-
the issuance of an unpriced order the parties were to negotiate price and deliv-
ery schedule, commencing with a proposal by the contractor, which was to
include, inter alia, a cost and price analysis as prescribed by ASPR 16-206.2
and an executed certificate of current cost and pricing data as required by
ASPR 3-807.4 (emphasis added).
344. 91-2 BCA (CCH) 23,911 (A.S. B.C.A. 1991).
345. Id. at 119,800.
346. These 6 appeals are: Appeals of GKS, Inc., 2000-1 BCA (CCH) $ 30,914 (A.S.
B.C.A. 2000); Appeals of McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Sys., 99-1 BCA (CCH) $ 30,271
(A.S. B.C.A. 1999); Appeals of Grumman Aerospace Corp., 98-2 BCA (CCH) 7 29,943
(A.S. B.C.A. 1998); Appeal of Hughes Aircraft Co., 97-1 BCA (CCH) 1 28,972 (A.S.
B.C.A. 1997); Appeal of EDO Corp., 93-3 BCA (CCH) 1 26,135 (A.S. B.C.A. 1993); and
Appeal of Honeywell Fed. Sys., Inc., 92-2 BCA (CCH) 9[ 24,966 (A.S. B.C.A. 1992).
347. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.215-10 (2002)
348. When submitted, "TINA requires that [the cost or pricing] data be submitted
before the award of a contract ...." TIEFER & SHOCK, supra note 302, at 144. "Cost or
pricing data" means "all facts that, as of the date of price agreement ... of a contract .... a
prudent buyer or seller would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly.
10 U.S.C. § 2306a(h)(1) (2002) (emphasis supplied).
349. The Commercial Item Exemption is:
[a]n exception to the requirement for the submission of cost or pricing data
under the Truth in Negotiations Act. This exception was added to 10 U.S.C.
§ 2306a(d) and 41 U.S.C. § 254b(d) by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355. It became the sole exception for commer-
cial items when the standard catalog or market price exception was repealed
in 1996 by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106. It is imple-
mented in FAR 15.403-1. Under this exception a contracting officer may not
require the submission of cost or pricing data for an acquisition of any item
that meets the definition in FAR 2.101.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 102.
[Vol. 55
BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS
ples, we must first accept the fact that BOAs are indeed valid and en-
forceable contracts.
The Appeals of GKS, Inc. (GKS), 350 illustrate the first scenario, where
based upon an underlying BOA, the "cost or pricing data" was requested
correctly at the time of "price agreement." In this appeal, the Govern-
ment and GKS entered into a BOA on March 6, 1990. The BOA incor-
porated FAR 52.215-22, the Price Reduction for Defective Cost or
Pricing Data, by reference. The Government asserted that it was entitled
to a refund of $134,561 plus interest under TINA on the grounds that the
contractor's proposal included a quotation for a part that was not speci-
fied and that the contractor failed to disclose seventeen lower quotations
in its possession prior to the agreement on price.351 The contractor coun-
tervailed that the contract price negotiated by the parties understated its
general and administrative rate by $44,434.32 and its material costs by
$5,463.63.352 The relevant facts of this case were essentially as follows.
On June 29, 1990, the Government issued [a] Request for Quotations
(RFQ) 353... for 87 KD 9 kits to four sources... [one of which was] GKS.
KD 9 kits are used to repair and overhaul E-3A aircraft .... The RFQ
was issued as a result of Desert Shield under the authority of 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(c)(2), which allow[ed] other than full and open competition when
the agency's need for the property or services is of "an unusual and com-
pelling urgency" ..... The kit was telefaxed to GKS on August 29, 1990.
. . . On 5 September 1990, GKS submitted a bid in the amount of
$466,190.37 for 87 units at $5,358.51 per unit .... Telephone negotiations
began and were concluded on 10 September 1990 .... The PCO [Procur-
ing Contracting Officer] requested GKS's proposal on 10 September 1990
[so it is safe to conclude that there was an "agreement on price" as of
September 10.354 Accordingly, GKS is an example where the govern-
ment sought the contractor's "cost or pricing data" in not only a timely
manner, but on the exact date of the "agreement on price."
Another case illustrating the government's timely request for "cost or
pricing data" after an "agreement of price" based upon an underlying
350. 00-1 BCA (CCH) 30,914 (A.S. B.C.A. 2000).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. A "Request for Quotations" has been defined as:
[a] solicitation document (usually Standard Form 18, FAR 53.301-18) used in
simplified acquisitions to communicate the Government requirements to
prospective contractors. FAR 13.307(b)(1). As it is merely a request for in-
formation, quotes submitted in response to it are not offers, and conse-
quently may not be accepted by the Government to form a binding contract.
(A contract comes into being only when the supplier accepts the Govern-
ment's order in response to its quotation or the parties mutually agree to a
subsequent contract.) An RFQ is also used by some agencies to obtain price,
delivery, or other information on sole source procurements. For simplified
acquisitions, quotations may be solicited orally, rather than in writing when-
ever economical and practical.
FAR 13.106-1(c). NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 441.
354. Appeals of GKS, Inc., 2000-1 BCA 30,914.
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BOA, is McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems 355 This appeal arose
from the Federal Government's charge that appellant provided defective
cost or pricing data with respect to various parts for the AH-64 Helicop-
ter.356 The Government issued a RFQ357 for the acquisition of 1,024
strap assemblies for the AH-64 Helicopter and appellant submitted a pro-
posal on June 1, 1990, to supply the strap assemblies for the price of
$7,781,008.55.358 On July 23, 1990, appellant subsequently lowered its
proposal price to $6,843,209.63. 359 The parties conducted negotiations on
the price from September 20, 1990 through September 27, 1990, when an
agreement on price was reached.360 On that very same day, September
27, appellant confirmed the parties' agreement and submitted its Certifi-
cate of Current Cost or Pricing Data to the Government. 361 On October
15, 1990, the Army awarded the contract to appellant, pursuant to the
then current BOA, for the production and delivery of 1,174 main rotor
strap assemblies spares at a total price of $6,445,260.362 Accordingly, the
Government did not request the cost or pricing data until there had been
an agreement on price, as required by the statute 363 and the
regulations.364
There is also an interesting case that illustrates not only the require-
ment of cost or pricing data of a priced BOA at the proper time, (i.e., the
time of the agreement on price), but also the successful assertion by ap-
pellant that TINA's commercial exception 365 should apply. It happened
in the Appeal of Honeywell Federal Systems, Inc. 366 This appeal arose
from a contracting officer's decision asserting a Government claim for
defective pricing against appellant in the amount of $10,500,000.367 The
Government filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that
there was no dispute of any relevant material facts. 368 In late 1980 or
early 1981, the Army began negotiations with appellant and fifteen other
companies for a BOA to supply DAS-3 spare parts with the goal of gain-
355. 99-1 BCA (CCH) $ 30,271 (A.S. B.C.A. 1999).
356. Id. (Finding of Fact 15 and 16).
357. See supra note 347 for the definition of RFQ.
358. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Sys., 99-1 BCA 30,271 (Finding of Fact 16) .
359. Id.
360. Id. (Finding of Fact 18).
361. Id.
362, Id.
363, 10 U.S.C. 2306a(g) (2002).
364. 48 C.F.R. § 15.401 (2002).
365. According to the FAR, the contracting officer shall not require the submission of
cost or pricing data for the procurement of commercial items so long as the items sought
constitute "commercial items." The nature or lack of information relating to price compe-
tition or catalog or marked pricing shall have no bearing on the applicability of this excep-
tion. 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-1(c)(3) (2002). The FAR also provides a detailed definition of
what is considered a "commercial item." In essence, a "commercial item" is a no frills
item; any item, other than real property that is customarily used for non-governmental
purposes and has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public, or offered for sale,
lease or license to the general public. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2002).





ing the best price benefits generally realized by 'breaking out' the pro-
curement of spare parts in this manner.369 The Army prepared a draft
BOA in early 1981 and by a memorandum dated January 28, 1981, the
Army's CO recommended that the Army's Communications-Electronic
Command (CECOM) approve the drafted BOA.370 On March 31, 1981,
the Awards Committee of CECOM recommended the award of the BOA
to Honeywell. 371 Honeywell and CECOM entered into a BOA on July
10, 1981, which required Honeywell to be ready to provide, when needed
by the Army, spare parts for its Level 6 computers necessary for the
maintenance of the Army's DAS-3.372
As with all BOAs, the BOA itself did not obligate the Army to
purchase the products described in the BOA.373 The BOA was initially
predicated upon Honeywell's proposal and proposed price list dated May
21, 1981, that stated in pertinent part "all equipment parts and repair of
parts are standard commercial items at standard commercial prices. ' 374
The BOA price list that accompanied Honeywell's proposal was "com-
piled by Honeywell to include only those parts identified by the Army as
being required under the BOA at prices based on Honeywell's Master
Parts Price List for commercial customers. '375 Perhaps because the BOA
appeared to have qualified for TINA's commercial exception, the Army's
delivery order did not include TINA's "Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data Clause. '376 The BOA specifically precluded "un-
priced orders" by specifying that the only orders to be placed under the
BOA were "priced orders" for supplies or services where the prices, de-
livery order schedule, and any special terms would be negotiated prior to
issuance.377 On or about September 25, 1981, the Army's CO issued De-
livery Order (DO) No. 0002, in the amount of $176,519, above the then
$100,000 TINA threshold for non-competitive negotiated procure-
ments.378 However, the CO did not request cost or pricing data.379 On
or about December 1, 1981, TINA's threshold was increased from
$100,000 to $500,000.380 It has subsequently been increased to
$550,000.381
On or about December 18, 1981, a new CECOM CO issued Delivery
Order No. 0007 in the amount of $505,028.382 There appeared to be an
369. Id.
370. Id. (Finding of Fact 7).
371. Honeywell Fed. Sys., Inc., 9202 B.C.A. (CCH) at 2,966.
372. Id. (Finding of Fact 9 and 10).
373. Id. (Finding of Fact 13).
374. Id. (Finding of Fact 11).
375. Id.
376. Honeywell Fed. Sys., Inc., 92-2 BCA (CCH) at 24,906 (Finding of Fact 14).
377. Id. (Finding of Fact 15).
378. Id. at 124,404. (Finding of Fact 16).
379. Id.
380. Honeywell Fed. Sys., Inc., 92-2 BCA (CCH) 24,766. (Finding of Fact 17); see
Dep't of Def. Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-186, 95 Stat. 1099.
381. 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-60 (2002).
382. Id. (Finding of Fact 18).
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agreement on price at this time because there was no subsequent finding
of fact explicating any further negotiations on this amount. Accordingly,
the Government had a right to ask for cost or pricing data. Two months
later, in February of 1982, the CO requested Honeywell "to furnish sup-
port for its claim for an exemption" from providing cost or pricing data to
the Army. 383
The Army argued that because of the "contractor's statement that the
proposed spare parts [were] not normally sold to commercial custom-
ers,384 we believe it [is] appropriate to request [Honeywell] to submit cost
or pricing data.. .,385 Honeywell countervailed that the "[p]roof of com-
merciality for DAS-3 spares being ordered under the BOA was unneces-
sary, since those spares were used in Basic Level 6 end-item computer
equipment and the Level 6 end-item equipment was available on Honey-
well's GSA DPE MAS contract. '386 Moreover, Honeywell argued, "[t]he
spare parts were found in Honeywell's published Master Parts Price List
for commercial customers, hence further proof of commerciality was not
required."387
On or about May 18, 1982, . .. [the Army] requested that the
DCAA 388 conduct a "priority 100% audit" of Honeywell's proposal
for [Honeywell's] BOA ... to determine whether: [t]he prices listed
under the BOA were the same or trackable to Honeywell's pub-
lished Master Parts Price List for commercial customers, "with price
increases deemed appropriate within the realms of good business
practices and normal inflation factors." 389
With respect to this DCAA audit to determine whether the "commercial"
exception applied, the Armed Services Board found that the "commer-
cial" exception did apply for Honeywell. The Board stated in pertinent
part that "[t]he results of this audit have 'determined that the prices of-
fered to the Government are the same as those offered in Honeywell's
Commercial Catalog,"' and "that Honeywell was entitled to a com-
383. Id. (Finding of Fact 19).
384. See supra text accompanying note 367.
385. Honeywell Fed. Sys., Inc., 92-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 24,966. (Finding of Fact 22).
386. Id. (Finding of Fact 21).
387. Id. (emphasis added).
388. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is
[a] DOD agency responsible for performing contract [audit] services for the
department. The DCAA was established by DOD Directive 5105.36, De-
fense Contract Audit Agency, on June 8, 1978, to perform all contract auditing
for DOD and to provide all DOD procurement and contract administration
activities with accounting and financial advisory services in connection with
negotiating, administering, and settling contracts and subcontracts. DCAA
also furnishes contract audit services to other Government agencies. DCCA
Contract Audit Manual 1-102. DCAA is a separate DOD agency under the
direction, authority, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). DCAA Contract Audit Manual 1-103.
NASH ET AL., supra note 1, at 168; see also DCAA Web Page at http://www.dcaa.mil (last
visited May 14, 2002); ABA, Section of Public Contract Law, GOVERNMENT CoNTRACr
LAW: THE DESKBOOK FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS 18 (2d ed. 1999).




merciality exception under TINA. ''390
Accordingly, Honeywell represents one of those more difficult cases
where the "commercial" exception was not particularly demarcated be-
cause the commercial item did not appear to be sold directly to the pub-
lic. It would appear to be logical that as an item sold to the Federal
Government becomes more and more specifically built for military use
only, the "commercial" exception becomes more attenuated, and, there-
fore, more difficult to qualify for. Here, because the spare parts were for
commercial computers, Honeywell had an easier time qualifying for the
''commercial" exception.
4. Bare BOAs (BOAs Which Have Not yet Received a Purchase
Order) Can Qualify as Bilateral Contracts and Still Fulfill
the Consideration Requirement According to TMM,
Notwithstanding the FAR
There are two classic stumbling blocks to construing BOAs and some
of the other IOUs, standing alone, as contracts. First, the FAR states
emphatically that a BOA is not a contract.391 Second, Boards of Contract
Appeals and Courts appear to have difficulty finding consideration in a
bare BOA or IOU.392 If consideration is lacking, there is no contract. 393
390. Id. at 124,409-10 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(b)(1)(B) (2002)).
391. "A basic ordering agreement is not a contract." 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a) (2002).
392. The Coast Guard argued a blanket purchase agreement is not a contract and does
not create any contract because there is no mutual consideration of each party either as-
suming a duty, which it does not otherwise have, or giving up some legal right which it is
not required to forgo. The court agreed with this in Cardiometrix, 94-1 BCA (CCH)
26,269 (D.O.T.C.A.B. 1993). Donald G. Gavin, Government Requirements Contracts, 5
PUB. CONT. L.J. 234, 237 (1972), points out that
[tihe great source of confusion with [blanket purchase agreements] has been
over whether or not it is actually an enforceable contract. The courts have
often held that, because of lack of consideration and mutuality, these con-
tracts at their inception are unenforceable, and they become valid and bind-
ing only to the extent that they are performed. This concern for lack of
consideration and mutuality stems from the nature of the arrangement. Usu-
ally the parties merely arrange to do business when the government places an
order at the unit price named in the [agreement]. In such an agreement,
there is nothing in writing which requires the government to take any ascer-
tainable quantity or amount.
Id. Petersen Equipment, 95-2 BCA (CCH) T 27,676 (Ag. B.C.A. 1995), held the mere
existence of an EERA places on the Government no legal obligation to order even a mini-
mum quantity of supplies or services. It also does not obligate the non-Government party
to provide them if ordered. Id.
393.
For a contract to be formed, certain elements must be present. Each of the
parties to the contract must possess legal capacity to contract; the parties
must each manifest assent to the terms of the agreement; the promise to be
enforced must be supported by consideration; the agreement must not re-
quire the performance of an illegal act by either party; and the agreement
must be in the form required by the applicable law.
JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 151 (2d
ed. 1986).
Any agreement can be a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act, pro-
vided that it meets the requirements for a contract with the Government,
specifically: mutual intent to contract including an offer, and acceptance, con-
2002]
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Accordingly, if there is no consideration in a bare BOA, there is no
contract.
While the CO's authority is occasionally the roadblock to formation of
a valid government contract, 394 Boards of Contract Appeals and Courts
have focused, more often than not, on what they perceive as a lack of
"consideration" when analyzing BOAs. More specifically, it is the lack of
a definite quantity term that appears to present the cardinal problem or
quandry. 395 However, it should be noted that under the FAR, any BOA
is required to have a price term or a means to determine its price.396
Moreover, a leading authority on Government Contracts has stated that
"[c]onsideration can be described as the price bargained and paid for a
promise. It may consist of an act, a forbearance or a return promise. '397
It is said "most government contracts involve a number of obligations of
or benefits to each party. In general, such contracts are not divided into
individual exchanges. Thus, the total benefit or detriment of one party is
normally thought to be consideration for the total obligations of the
other.398 This generally conforms to the definition of "consideration"
proffered by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:
(1) [T]o constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is bar-
gained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise
and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. (3) The
sideration, and a Government representative who had actual authority to
bind the Government.... As such, contrary to the opinion of the trial court,
a MOA can also be a contract.
Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 104 F.3d. 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "The
requirements for a valid contract with the United States are: a mutual intent to contract
including offer, acceptance, and consideration; and authority on the part of the govern-
ment representative who entered or ratified the agreement to bind the Unites States in
contract." Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
394. "Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any of his designated representatives had
the authority to obligate CHAMPUS beyond these base [pay] rates set by regulation. The
government 'is not bound by its agents acting beyond their authority and contrary to regu-
lation."' Total Med. Mgmt., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1321.
395.
It shall be distinctly understood and agreed that ... the contractor will fur-
nish any quantity of the coal specified (i. e., of the kind and quality specified)
that may be needed ... irrespective of the quantities stated, the government
not being obligated to order any specific quantity, . . . and that the stated
quantities "are estimated and are not to be considered as having any bearing
upon the quantity which the government may order under the contract; ...
the right is also reserved to make such distribution of tonnage among the
different bidders . . . as will be considered for the best interests of the
government."
There is nothing in the writing that required the government to take, or lim-
ited its demand to, any ascertainable quantity. It must be held that, for lack
of consideration and mutuality, the contract was not enforceable.
Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 493 (1923).
396. "Each basic ordering agreement shall- (i) Describe the method for determining
prices to be paid to the contractor for the supplies or services." 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(c)(1)
(2002).
397. CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 395, at 188.
398. Id. at 193.
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performance may consist of: (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a
forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction of a le-
gal relation. (4) The performance or return promise may be given to
the promisor or to some other person.399
However, the Federal Circuit has come to the rescue of bare BOAs in
their quest for consideration and ultimate contract status. In Total Medi-
cal Management,400 the Federal Circuit found "consideration" simply by
the existence of the parties' "mutuality of obligation." The Federal Cir-
cuit explained "[hiere, the existence of the negotiated, signed MOUs evi-
dences [the] offer and acceptance. There was also consideration in the
mutuality of obligation: TMM is to provide discounted health services; the
Army is to provide support staff and free space in the military hospi-
tal."'401 The Federal Circuit's finding of "consideration" in a bare BOA
simply by the "mutuality of obligation" is consistent with the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. 402 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit in
TMM has given its imprimatur to the legal postulate that the mere mutu-
ality of obligation contained in all BOAs is sufficient to constitute "con-
sideration," thereby creating an enforceable contract.
5. As Required by the CDA, Bare BOAs Also are Always for "The
Benefit of the Government"
Another requirement for a contract to qualify as a Government con-
tract is that it must be for the "benefit of the government." As the Fed-
eral Circuit explicated in TMM, "[f]inally the government argues that...
the MOUs are not subject to the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 602(a), because they are not procurement contracts for the benefit of
the government. 40 3
In almost every BOA, however, a very persuasive argument can be
made that each BOA confers a "benefit on the government. '40 4 For in-
stance, in the case of emergency orders or the issuance of multiple similar
"orders," there is value to both parties in avoiding a fresh negotiation
over the terms of the purchase. These agreements contemplate the abil-
ity to avoid the future negotiation of the terms of each order; both parties
save time in an emergency situation, such as in an "Emergency Equip-
ment Rental Agreement." Indeed, in the case of an emergency equip-
ment rental agreement (EERA), the saving of time may save the very
asset which is sought to be protected, i.e., our national forest, buildings of
the Forest Service, and even adjacent residential homes. Moreover, if too
much time transpires, the need for the contractor's service may expire
with the loss of our precious national forest, government building, or ad-
399. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
400. 104 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
401. Id. (emphasis added).
402. See supra text accompanying note 401.




jacent residential homes. Both parties save time, and hence money, in
obviating a repetitive purchasing situation.
Consider also, for example, a physician-patient professional services
setting. If the Government and the contractor physician had to negotiate
the terms of treatment, including payment discounts, each time a govern-
ment-sponsored patient entered the doctor's office, the cost of the gov-
ernment-medical systems would explode due to the cost of negotiations
alone, not to mention the loss of volume purchasing discounts which are
available under these preferred provider arrangements. Similarly, the
promise of government referrals of healthcare consumers has value to the
physician or other provider. This is especially so when the referral is cou-
pled with sanctions against the patient for not using a preferred provider.
It is this saving of time and money that is contemplated and bargained for
in the BOA.
Accordingly, almost all BOAs fulfill the requirement that the contract
be for the "benefit of the government. '405 Thus, it is consistent with
traditional thought that consideration is furnished within an instrument of
understanding such as a BOA. Negotiation, as to the bulk of the terms of
future order-performance contracts, is agreed by both parties to be lim-
ited to the one negotiation concerning the BOA, rather than the multiple
negotiations that would result pursuant to the many future "orders" that
may occur. It is bargained for by both parties in a BOA and furnishes
consideration for each other's promise to forbear further negotiation.
The Uniform Grain Storage Agreement (UGSA) from the Agriculture
Board of Contract Appeals is a final example. The UGSA's Scope provi-
sion states: "[u]nless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the provi-
sions of this Agreement apply to all CCC-interest (Commodity Credit
Corporation) grain as of the date of deposit or the date title is transferred
to CCC, until such grain is loaded out or title is transferred from CCC to
another party (transferee)." 406 It is the terms of the agreement for which
both parties are bargaining. In the UGSA's table of contents the CCC's
responsibilities are listed as are those of the Warehouse Operator. 407 It is
this mutuality of promises to forbear future negotiations that provides the
required consideration in a bare BOA. It is a bilateral contract, which
becomes enforceable at its execution. Whether subsequent unilateral
contracts for storage ultimately come into being are irrelevant to the
UGSA's contract status, though they will be governed by it. Any unilat-
eral storage contract which does come into being is only a condition pre-
cedent to the maturation of the duty to forbear further negotiation
concerning the terms of storage.
Finally, while the FAR and most case law state that "[a] basic ordering
405. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2002).
406. Commodity Credit Corp., U.S. Dep't. of Agric., Unif. Grain and Rice Storage




agreement is not a contract, '408 it nevertheless intrinsically treats a BOA
as if it were a contract because it assumes that the terms of a BOA are
enforceable. For instance, the FAR states that a BOA shall "[s]pecify the
point at which each order becomes a binding contract (e.g., issuance of
the order [such as a purchase order], acceptance of the order in a speci-
fied manner, or failure to reject the order within a specified number of
days.)" 409 In fact, the FAR's language of "failure to reject the order
within a specified number of days" strongly suggests the existence of "an
option contract. 410
Pursuant to the definition of an option contract, the promisor (the Fed-
eral Government) would also be limited for a "specified number of days"
from revoking or changing the terms of the BOA; at that point in time, at
least an option contract must exist. However, according to the FAR, be-
cause a BOA is not a contract at all; arguendo, it could never qualify as
any type of a contract including an option contract.
Accordingly, I believe Section 16.703 of the FAR is in error, is an oxy-
moron, or at best is an unexplainable conundrum. It states on the one
hand that a BOA is not a contract, but on the other hand explicitly im-
plies that a BOA contains a bilateral contract 411 with enforceable
promises from both parties (the Federal Government and the private
408. 48 C.F.R. 16.703(a) (1991); Zoubi v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 581 (1992) (finding
that a BOA between an interpreter and the State Department was not a contract, but
rather that a contract arose only when the interpreter accepted a work order that the State
Department's Office of Language Services issued authorizing the interpreter to perform
services and providing that payment would be made according to the rate schedule in the
BOA); Modern Sys. Tech. Corp., 24 Cl. Ct. 699 (1992) (holding that a basic pricing agree-
ment entered into by a government agency and a contractor was not a binding contract but
merely a framework for future contracts, since there was no language in the agreement
indicating any present intent that either party be bound and since the terms were not suffi-
ciently definite).
See Modern Sys. Tech., 24 Cl. Ct. at 403. "The main treatises and hornbooks on govern-
ment contracts also support the interpretation of the BPA as a mere framework for future
contracts. The authors of these books note that a basic agreement does not contain any
exchange of promises. Contractual obligations will arise only after an order is placed."
RALPH C. NASH & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW, 473-74 (3d ed. 1977);
EUGENE W. MASSENGALE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL CONTRACT LAW 77 (1991) ("The
basic ordering agreement is not a contract as such."). As McBride and Touhey comment,
such agreements serve the purpose of consolidating
into one instrument of indefinite duration those contract provisions which
will be standard to every contract with a particular concern. In this way,
prolonged and repeated contract negotiations are curtailed, if not eliminated,
and the parties are spared the bother and expense of going over the same
ground again and again. In essence, this arrangement is an agreement to
agree, a set of ground rules as it were, and no obligations are assumed by
either party until orders are given by the Government and accepted by the
contractor. In other words, the basic agreement of itself is not a contract,
and does not become a contract except to the extent that orders are issued
under it.
JOHN C. McBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 18.70 (1984).
409. 48 C.F.R. 16.703(c) (1) (iv) (2002).
410. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979) (emphasis added). "An op-
tion contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and
limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer." Id. at § 25.
411. See supra text accompanying text 401.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
contractor). 412 The Federal Government cannot have it both ways. If the
BOA is indeed not an actual contract, then the basic terms of a BOA are
not enforceable against either the private contractor or the Federal Gov-
ernment. Consequently, all the terms of the BOA would logically still be
subject to new negotiations whenever the Government proffers a subse-
quent purchase order. This scenario, of course, would be a disaster for
the Government because it would be unable to receive its goods or ser-
vices in a timely manner at a previously agreed-upon price once it issued
its future purchase orders for goods or services. For example, as dis-
cussed earlier, once a forest fire has started, the Forest Service does not
wish to once again negotiate the terms of an EERA because such a delay
would cause too much loss to our national forest, related government
buildings, and adjacent residential homes for which the government may
be liable. 413
6. Under TMM and TSG, the "Bare" BOA Itself, If It Meets all the
Elements of a Government Contract, Can Serve as the Basis
for a Well-Pled Contract That Would Overcome a
Government's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit was clear in TMM that bare BOAs standing alone,
without a purchase or service order, could still be a contract, when it
stated: "[h]ere, the existence of the negotiated, signed MOUs evidence
[the required] offer and acceptance. There was also consideration in the
mutuality of obligation: TMM is to provide discounted health care ser-
vices; the Army is to provide support staff and free space in the military
hospital. ' '414 The Federal Circuit also broadly interpreted the CDA re-
quirement that the contract must also be for the "benefit for the govern-
ment" in TMM, stating that finally: "the government argues that, [even] if
412. Section 16.703(c)(1) of the FAR states:
Each Basic ordering agreement shall-
(i) Describe the method for determining prices to be paid to the contractor
for the supplies or services;
(ii) Include delivery terms and conditions or specify how they will be
determined;
(iii) List one or more Government activities authorized to issue orders under
the agreement;
(iv) Specify the point at which each order becomes a binding contract (e.g.,
issuance of the order, acceptance of the order in a specified manner, or fail-
ure to reject the order within a specified number of days);
(v) Provide that failure to reach agreement on price for any order issued
before its price is established ... is a dispute under the Disputes clause in-
cluded in the basic ordering agreement; and
(vi) If fast payment procedures will apply to orders, include the special data
required by 13.403.
48 C.F.R. 16.703(c)(1) (2002).
413. The Thcker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2002), makes the United States liable for im-
plied-in-fact contracts, and it may be argued that the Government had an implied-in-fact
contract to not let its forest fires spread so far as to endanger the nearby adjacent homes
and villages.
414. Total Med. Mgmt., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1320.
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[they are] contracts, the MOUs are not subject to the Contract Disputes
act, 41 U.S.C. § 602(a), because they are not procurement contracts for
the benefit of the government. ' 415 The Federal Circuit concluded, "[w]e
reject this argument since it is clear that the government has legal obliga-
tions to military dependents and benefits by obtaining said dependents'
care at a reduced cost." 416
The Federal Circuit also broadly interpreted the parameters of the
Tucker Act in TSG when it stated that "[a]ny agreement can be a contract
within the meaning of the Tucker Act, provided that it meets the require-
ments for a contract with the Government, specifically: mutual intent to
contract, including an offer and acceptance, consideration, and a Govern-
ment representative who had actual authority to bind the
Government." 417
Moreover, Section 71 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS is
clear that the exchange of a promise for a promise is more than sufficient
to constitute or fulfill the "consideration" needed to form a contract
where it states: "[flo constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for. A performance or return promise is bar-
gained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. '418 Accordingly,
because TMM and TSG, as discussed above, also stand for the proposi-
tion that a bare BOA alone, as long as it is for the benefit of the govern-
ment, can be a government contract, 419 simply pleading a bare BOA
alone should be sufficient to overcome a Government's Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
C. FAR AND DFARS CHANGES WHICH ARE NEEDED
BECAUSE OF TRAUMA SERVICE GROUP AND
TOTAL MEDICAL MANAGEMENT
There are at least eighty-four sections in the FAR and DFARS that
refer to BOAs. 420 These eighty-four sections should all be changed to re-
flect the fact that the Federal Circuit held in TMM and TSG that a bare
BOA itself can be a government contract as long as the BOA is for the
"benefit of the government."' 421 Two sections of FAR and DFARS par-
415. Id.
416. Id. (emphasis added).
417. See Trauma Serv. Group, 104 F.3d at 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
419. The Federal Circuit was clear in TMM that bare BOAs standing alone, without a
purchase or service order, could still be a contract, when it stated: "[h]ere, the existence of
the negotiated, signed MOUs evidences [the required] offer and acceptance. There was
also consideration in the mutuality of obligation: TMM is to provide discounted health care
services; the Army is to provide support staff and free space in the military hospital."
Total. Med. Mgmt., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1320.
420. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 2.101, 32.104, 32.502-4, 3.104-3, 42.302, 4.203, 5.203, 5.207,
5.504, 13.301, 16.701, 16.703, 19.804-5, 22.305, 22.603, 22.605, 32.501-3, 42.202, 47.205,
53.213, 53.216-1, 204.7303, 204.670-1, 204.670-2, 204.7003, 204.201, 204.203, 204.7004,
253.204-70, 242.302, 253.204-70 and ch. 2, app. F (2002).
421. See supra text accompanying notes 416.
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ticularly stand out and call for change. The first is section 16.703, which
states unequivocally that a BOA is not a contract. Using the Federal Cir-
cuit's TMM and TSG decisions, a forceful argument can be made that the
BOA's definition in the FAR must be changed from: (1) "[a] basic order-
ing agreement is not a contract" 422 to (1) "[a] basic ordering agreement is
a contract," or at the very least "[a] basic ordering agreement may be a
contract," with citations to TSG and TMM.
Second, section 2.101 (entitled "Definitions") must be changed with re-
spect to its definition of a contract. It presently states in pertinent part:
"[Clontract" means a mutually binding legal relationship obligating
the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including construction)
and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of commitments
that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds
and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. [I]n addition
to bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to)
awards and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued under
basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase
orders, under which the contract becomes effective by written ac-
ceptance or performance and bilateral contract modifications. Con-
tracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements covered by
31 U.S.C. 6301, et seq. For discussion of various types of contracts,
see Part 16.423
Pursuant to the Federal Circuit's TMM and TSG decisions holding that a
BOA with mutuality of promises which are for the benefit of the Govern-
ment qualifies as a contract, the definition of a contract in the FAR
should be changed from: (1) "[i]t [the contract] includes all types of com-
mitments that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropri-
ated funds and that . . . are in writing; '424 to (1) "[i]t [the contract]
includes all types of commitments that obligate the Government to an
expenditure of appropriated funds or that obligate the Government to an
exchange of mutual promises which benefit the Government and that ...
are in writing."
In addition, in the same paragraph, the following sentence should also
be changed to reflect the Federal Circuit's decisions in TSG and TMM.
The further definition of a contract in the FAR should be changed from:
(1) "[i]n addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not
limited to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued
under basis ordering agreements; '425 to (2) "[i]n addition to bilateral in-
struments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards and notices
of awards; basic ordering agreements where there are exchanges of mutual
promises between the contractor and the Government which benefit the
Government. .. ."
422. 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a) (2002) (emphasis added).





These above recommended changes will go far in correcting and up-
grading the FAR with respect to the new definitions of BOAs as expli-
cated by the Federal Circuit's rulings in TSG and TMM.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's decisions in TSG and TMM were instrumental
for the future rights of all BOA contractors, who are now entitled imme-
diately to their trial on the merits at the U. S. Court of Federal Claims
instead of having to first survive a wasteful preliminary hearing on a Rule
12(b)(1) motion in that same forum. By simply filing a complaint alleging
a well-pled contract, the BOA contractor will have its day in court on the
merits of its case. This, in itself, is a monumental achievement for gov-
ernment contractors who, for such a long period of time, were refused the
right of a trial on the merits as a result of the Government filing with its
Answer, its favorite motion, the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
These touchstone decisions by the Federal Circuit in TSG and TMM,
holding that BOAs, standing alone, can qualify as contracts, were indis-
pensable to helping contractors prove that BOAs were enforceable con-
tracts. These two decisions resolve the contractor's "Catch-22"
Chameleon" BOA problem, and should force the Government to revise
those particular FAR sections which state that BOAs are not contracts.
Such revisions will go far in solving the fundamentally unfair internal con-
tradictions now found in the FAR, i.e., that BOAs are not contracts, not-
withstanding the presence of an offer, an acceptance, and the mutuality of
obligations set forth in all BOAs.
Accordingly, the Federal Government should relinquish and cease its
war against BOAs because its arguments that BOAs are not contracts are
clearly erroneous and also seriously undermine: (1) the Federal Govern-
ment's right to enforce any BOA; (2) the Government's right to have
TINA apply to BOAs; and (3) the Government's right to "Christian" in
any TINA provision that has been inadvertently left out of a BOA.
The Federal Circuit's finding in TMM that the bare BOAs, i.e., the ne-
gotiated and signed MOUs, standing alone, nevertheless still contained
the consideration necessary to create a contract by virtue of the mutuality
of obligation, goes far to help alleviate the contractor's "Catch-22 Cha-
meleon" problem associated with past BOAs. I applaud the Federal Cir-
cuit for its outstanding equitable decision in TMM, that bare BOAs
without any subsequent actions on the part of any of the parties neverthe-
less still contained sufficient consideration to form an enforceable con-
tract. The Federal Circuit's TMM decision provides a quantum equitable
leap in the right direction by providing BOAs with contractual status
from the beginning as negotiated bilateral contracts, thus eliminating,
once and for all, the contractor's "Catch-22 Chameleon" problem with
BOAs.
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